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NEITHER TINKER, NOR HAZELWOOD, NOR FRASER, NOR
MORSE: WHY VIOLENT STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS
REPRESENT A UNIQUE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
William C. Nevin*

In the first year after the April 20, 1999, shooting at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado, scholars were quick to note the rush to censorship across the
country, including discipline for a high school newspaper columnist who suggested
satirically that assassinating the president would be a good stress reliever;1 the efforts
in Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico, and Tennessee to ban the style of trench coats
worn by the Columbine shooters;2 andironically enoughcases in Louisiana and
Texas involving administrators who attempted to prevent students from wearing black
armbands.3 It was simply, as Professor Clay Calvert wrote, a story of censorship.4
Two years after the shooting, the story was much the same as scholars noted a
drastic increase in expulsions and suspensions for behavior or speech . . . neither
criminal nor violent.5 The legal principles underlying this constrict[ion] of First
Amendment rights were not entirely apparent, as lawyer Edward T. Ramey wrote, but
it was expression that bore the brunt of many of the emotional aftershocks of the
Columbine attack6 because the fear of violence on a tragic scale gave administrators
* Instructor, journalismand speech at the University of West Alabama. B.A., 2007, Communication, University of Alabama; J.D., 2010, University of Alabama School of Law; Ph.D., 2014,
Communication and Information Sciences, University of Alabama. A version of this Article was
first published in the authors dissertation, Students, Violence, and Violent Student Speech: The
Preservation of First Amendment Rights in a Frightening Age. The author would like to thank
his committee for their guidance in preparing the dissertation, the editors of this journal for
their work in publishing this Article, and his wife Kate for her continued love and support.
1
Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV.U. L.REV.739, 742 (2000) [hereinafter Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools].
2
Richard C. Demerle, Note, The New Scylla and Charybdis: Student Speech vs. Student
Safety After Columbine, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 428, 430 (2001).
3
David L. Hudson, Jr., Fear of Violence in Our Schools: Is Undifferentiated Fear in
the Age of Columbine Leading to a Suppression of Student Speech?, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 79,
7980 (2002); see also Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools, supra note 1, at 739 (detailing
the story of a Dallas, Texas high school student who wore an armband to mourn the students
killed at Columbine and later had to sue her school to protect her expressive rights and prevent
a three-day suspension from being noted in her transcript).
4
Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools, supra note 1, at 740.
5
Kathryn E. McIntyre, Note, Hysteria Trumps First Amendment: Balancing Student Speech
with School Safety, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 39, 41 (2002).
6
Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of Columbine,
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 709 (2000).
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all the reasonslegitimate or illegitimatethey needed to trounce the First Amendment rights of public school students, according to Professors Robert D. Richards
and Clay Calvert.7
After Columbine was followed by a 2005 school shooting in Red Lake, Minnesota, that killed five students, a teacher, and a security guard; the 2007 Virginia Tech
massacre that killed thirty-two people; the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut, that killed twenty elementary school children and
six adults; and many other lower-profile school-related incidents (in addition to the
shootings in Tucson, Arizona, and Aurora, Colorado),8 the resulting media coverage
made it difficult for any fears of school violence to subsideeven if schools themselves
were getting safer.9 In short, much like the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
7

Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U.L.REV. 1089, 1091 (2003); see, e.g., Kyle W.
Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School Authority over Student
Cyberspeech through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L.REV. 1206, 1206 (2008)
([S]chool administrators lack a strong incentive to protect the free speech rights of their studentsthey are more concerned with preserving the integrity of the educational process
against perceived threats.); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 52 (School shootings have generated
a climate of fear, but that fear does not provide a rational basis for curtailing a students First
Amendment rights or excluding them from education.).
8
Timeline of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings: Gun-related Tragedies in the U.S.
and Around the World, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
9
See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 3, at 10304 (School advocates may well cite their
earnest desire to prevent another Columbine. . . . [B]ecause of Columbine, Springfield, and other
incidents, school safety concerns trump free-speech rights. There are several problems with
this phenomenon. First, it is not at all clear that there has been a marked increase in school
violence. Some studies have shown the oppositethat school violence is on the decline. . . . Just
because the media reports on a subject does not necessarily mean that there is an increase in
that phenomenon. Oftentimes, our societyand particularly the mediaseize on certain
anomalous events and incorrectly report a disturbing trend.); Richard Salgado, Comment,
Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and
the Search for Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 1371, 139394 ([S]tatistically speaking, schools are among the safest places for children
to be. In any given year, a student is three to four times more likely to be hit by lightning than
to be the victim of violence in school. Yet an atmosphere of fear has become pervasive in the
nations schools. Fueled by media hype, fear of the unthinkable and, perhaps, a bit of guilt,
more parents are demanding that school boards implement strict policies to deal with kids
who step out of line. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. David Watkins
& John S. Hooks, The Legal Aspects of School Violence: Balancing School Safety with Students
Rights, 69 MISS. L.J. 641, 64445 (1999) ([T]he number of twelfth graders who reported
being injured by a weapon while at school did not increase significantly between 1976 and
1996. In fact, a recent study measuring trends in nonfatal violent behaviors among adolescents
in the United States between 1991 and 1997 indicates significant linear decreases in aggressive
behaviors such as fighting and carrying guns onto school property. A survey of principals of
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changed the way Americans view terrorism, Columbine and subsequent violent attacks changed the way administrators and courts evaluate school safety and the freedoms allotted to studentsespecially those students who express themselves with
violent imagery.10
Presumably under the guise of preventing future attacks, episodes of school violence can also prompt administrators to target student speech that expresses violent
themes.11 The 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, according to one expert in the area of student speech, prompted a revival of a more aggressive stance toward violent student
speech as [s]chools are looking for and making up things out of statements that, in
the past, would have been passed over as foolish kid talk.12 Broadly speaking,
cases dealing with violent student speech can be separated into three categories:
violent expression related to pedagogy and classroom activities, violent expression
unrelated to pedagogy, and student speech that truly threatens others. This Article
will focus on the first of those categories: violent expression incorporated into a
childs education.
There is perhaps no better example of both violent expression related to pedagogy and the rush to punish violent student speech than the facts highlighted in Cuff
ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Central School District.13 In Cuff, a ten-year-old fifth-grade
student identified in court documents as B.C. was completing an assignment in
science class wherein he was to both color a drawing of an astronaut and write a
wish of anything he wanted on the spacemans leg.14 After a slew of questions
prompted the teacher to offer, When I mean anything you want, anything. You can
schools with seventy-five percent or more of the student population living in poverty, showed
significant reductions in the number of conflicts among students, in the use of drugs and alcohol
among students, and in physical or verbal abuse of teachers. Data from the National Crime
Victimization Survey for 1996 indicate that incidences of violent victimization among adolescents are at their lowest levels since the survey instrument was revised in 1992. Despite recent
tragedies, homicides in school are extremely rare events. (footnotes omitted)); Angie Fox,
Note and Comment, Waiting to Exhale: How Bong Hits 4 Jesus Reduces Breathing Space
for Student Speakers & Alters the Constitutional Limits on Schools Disciplinary Actions
Against Student Threats in the Light of Morse v. Frederick, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 435
([R]esearch demonstrates that school violence in this country has steadily declined since the
early 1990s, when it peaked alongside other forms of juvenile crime.).
10
Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: Stretching the
High Courts Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 21
(2008) [hereinafter Calvert, Misuse and Abuse].
11
Judy Wang, Sensitive Speech: High Schools React to Violent Expression After Virginia
Tech Massacre, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Aug. 1, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.splc.org
/news/report_detail.asp?id=1365&edition=43.
12
Id. (quoting an interview with Mike Hiestand, a legal consultant for the Student Press
Law Center).
13
677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012).
14
Id. at 111.
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write about missiles,15 B.C. decided to write his wish: Blow up the school with the
teachers in it.16
Many of his classmates laughed at B.C.s scribblings, but another was so concerned that she told the science teacher what B.C. had written.17 The teacher found
little humor in the elementary students wish and sent him to the principals office.18
After meeting first with B.C. and then his parents, the principal decided to suspend
the student for a total of six days.19 B.C.s parents objected to his punishment and
sued the school district, alleging a violation of the childs First Amendment rights.20
The plaintiffs, however, found little redress as the school district was granted summary
judgment in federal district court, a decision upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In its decision, the Second Circuit made it clear courts should defer to school administrators where violent speech is concerned: [I]n the context of student speech
favoring violent conduct, it is not for courts to determine how school officials should
respond. School administrators are in the best position to assess the potential for harm
and act accordingly.21 In deciding the case, the court focused on the Tinker22 standard, applying it as whether school officials might reasonably portend disruption
from the student expression at issue.23 The court also stressed that the standard was
objective, focusing on the reasonableness of the school administrations response.24
Yet in ultimately concluding that the administrations response was reasonable, the
court showed just how unreasonable and reactionary it was. The court noted that the
astronaut drawing caused one student to become very worried, but that was not
enough to meet the Tinker standard and justify the silencing of B.C.s expression.25
To do that, the court engaged in extended and elaborate speculation:
School administrators might reasonably fear that, if permitted,
other students might well be tempted to copy, or escalate, B.C.s
conduct. This might then have led to a substantial decrease in
15

Id. at 116 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 111. B.C. had been disciplined by teachers and school administrators for misbehavior in and around school before his drawing. Id. His previous misbehavior included two
similar incidents: a drawing depicting someone firing a gun and a story he wrote in fourth
grade about a natural disaster in America that demolished all the schools and killed all the
teachers. Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 112 (noting that the students punishment included five days of off-campus suspension and another day of in-school suspension).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 113.
22
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23
Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 114.
16
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discipline, an increase in behavior distracting students and teachers from the educational mission, and tendencies to violent acts.
Such a chain of events would be difficult to control because the
failure to discipline B.C. would give other students engaging in
such behavior an Equal Protection argument to add to their First
Amendment contentions. . . . A failure of the appellees to respond forcefully to the wish might have led to a decline of
parental confidence in school safety with many negative effects,
including, e.g., the need to hire security personnel and even a
decline in enrollment.
Thus, appellees could reasonably have concluded that B.C.s
astronaut drawing would substantially disrupt the school environment, and their resulting decision to suspend B.C. was constitutional.26
According to the courts argument, if B.C.s drawing was not punished, other students might copy his expression to such an extent that the student body would be both
distracted and prone to violent acts. Then, teachers and administrators would be
unable to control the school to such a degree that parents would lose faith in their abilities, thereby resulting in decreased enrollment. The Second Circuits claims are so
speculative and so exaggerated that it might have gotten the same mileage out of simply
trying to pin the potential downfall of Western civilization on B.C.s crayon drawing.
This Article contends that violent student assignments represent a challenge not
adequately addressed in current case law. Under current Supreme Court student
speech jurisprudence, Tinker27 governs extracurricular student speech when it encroaches upon the grounds of the school, Fraser28 addresses sexually explicit student
speech, Hazelwood29 controls where the student speech implicates pedagogical
concerns and bears the sign of sponsorship from the school, and Morse30 enables a
school to act against a student speaker advocating the use of illegal drugs. 31 There
is, however, a clear gap in the current framework when student speech is part of the
school curriculum yet it lacks any sign of the schools imprimatur.32 This speech is
exemplified by student assignments such as the crayon wish in Cuff 33 where student
expression is integrated into the curriculum but it lacks any real possibility of being
mistaken for official school speech. Without the schools imprimatur, such speech
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 11415 (footnote omitted).
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
See infra Part I for a full discussion of the Supreme Courts student speech jurisprudence.
Hazelwood, 478 U.S. at 271.
Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2012).
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falls outside of the realm of Hazelwood, and yet it is still connected to curriculum,
therefore making it inappropriate to decide using Tinkers material and substantial
disruption analysis.
Thus this Article will both (1) explore a subset of violent student speech cases that
could rightly be considered under Hazelwood if only the student expression bore the
sign of official school sponsorship and (2) argue for the creation of a new standard
based on Hazelwood to govern non-sponsored curricular speech. Furthermore, this
new standard would operate much like the current Hazelwood analysis with one key
distinction: where student speech is curricular and non-sponsored in nature, the only
options available to school administrators would be those representing pedagogical
counter-speech. Punitive discipline, such as the suspension seen in Cuff, would not
be allowed under this new standard because it represents a corruption of the education process and a fundamental unfairness to students whose only transgression was
to simply turn in an assignment or otherwise attempt to further their education.
Part I will detail Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence. Part II will examine
several violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases, identifying common
fact patterns and tracing favored modes of analysis in lower courts. Part III will address
why current Supreme Court jurisprudence fails to adequately address these cases.
Part IV establishes the non-sponsored curricular speech standard by detailing its operation and examining the administrative options under the standard. The conclusion applies this standard to a selection of applicable cases.
I. SUPREME COURT STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The Supreme Court began its substantive exploration in student speech with its
1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.34
In Tinker, school administrators learned of a plan formulated by students and local
adults to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.35 To prevent students from doing so, area principals met and decided to institute a policy so that any
student with an armband would be first asked to remove it before being suspended.36
Three students wore armbands in violation of the policy, refused to remove them, and
were subsequently suspended.37 The fathers of the students then sued, seeking both
an injunction against further discipline and nominal damages.38 They found no relief
34
35
36
37
38

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at the district court level, however, as the court upheld the actions of the administrators as constitutional in light of their responsibilities to maintain school discipline.39
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit split equally in an en banc
decision, thereby affirming the lower courts decision in favor of the school district.40
Simply stated, the issue before the Supreme Court in Tinker was a matter of determining who wins when the free expression rights of students collide with the rules
of school officials.41 In finding for the students, the Court established a new standard
by which to evaluate the question of expression versus school discipline:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained.42
The Court found the school administrators arguments of possible school disruption
unconvincing.43 As the majority opinion concluded, there was no evidence whatever of petitioners interference, actual or nascent, with the schools work and the
armbands in no way interfered with the rights of other students. 44 Simply fearing
negative repercussions resulting from the armbands was not sufficient to punish
students because, as the Court argued, the undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas established early in the Courts opinion
the thinking that would underlie his analysis when he wrote, It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,46 a line cited in some form in almost every subsequent student speech case. To emphasize the broad nature of child First Amendment
rights, Justice Fortas also explained that the free expression rights belonging to students
were not temporally, physically, or scholastically limited:
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 50405.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
See id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506.
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The principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised and
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable
part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part
of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do not
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding
with the rights of others.47
Thus, according to the majority, the free speech rights of students are not to be limited to the confines of the classroom or even to administration-approved discussion
topics. As the Court would later characterize Tinker, the decision shows that while
children are subject to more state authority than adults, the state may not arbitrarily
deprive [children] of their freedom of action altogether.48
Justice Hugo Black, however, wrote a scathing dissent49 in Tinker, arguing the
majoritys decision represented a shift of the power to control pupils from school administrators to the Court.50 By the time the case was decided, Justice Black was nearing
the end of his tenure on the Court, and, according to biographer Roger K. Newman, it
was a period notable for an increasing number of dissents51 and the loss of the marked
sense of knowing when not to write.52 The Justice took his Tinker dissent both
seriously and personally, as it began with a set of handwritten notes that were typed,
retyped, and even edited shortly before he read his dissent from the bench. 53 Before
47

Id. at 51213 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d
at 749).
48
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 n.15 (1979) (plurality opinion).
49
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
50
Id.
51
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 588 (1994); see also JOHN W.
JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S 176
(1997) (finding that Justice Black dissented on eighteen occasions during the term Tinker was
decided, the most of any Justice on the Court).
52
NEWMAN, supra note 51, at 588. Newman noted that, as early as 1966, friends and family
noticed a change in Justice Blacks demeanor, and the Justice himself confided in 1967 that
Court work is harder now and my mind isnt as quick. Id. at 589. In the spring of 1968,
Justice Black also suffered transitory (or mini) strokes. Id.
53
JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 176.
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he began reading, Justice Black took the opportunity to deliver extemporaneous remarks, beginning them in part with his declaration that I want it thoroughly known
that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any part of what the Court does today.54
Justice Black, a self-professed First Amendment absolutist,55 viewed the case
primarily as one deciding the proper time and place of speech instead of an administrative ban on the speech of students; as he plainly stated in his dissent, I have never
believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations
where he pleases and when he pleases.56 Justice Black also suggested the majority
opinion revived the Lochner57-era practice of acting as a super legislature58 before
concluding that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age
they need to learn, not teach.59 Arguments for judicial restraint and time, place, and
manner restrictions aside, the Justice also framed speech rights for students as turning
over control of the nations schools to the children who attend them, writing:
54

Id.
See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.REV. 865, 867 (1960) (It is my belief
that there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by
men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be absolutes. The whole
history and background of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as I understand it, belies the
assumption or conclusion that our ultimate constitutional freedoms are no more than our
English ancestors had when they came to this new land to get new freedoms. The historical
and practical purposes of a Bill of Rights, the very use of a written constitution, indigenous
to America, the language the Framers used, the kind of three-department government they
took pains to set up, all point to the creation of a government which was denied all power to
do some things under any and all circumstances, and all power to do other things except
precisely in the manner prescribed.).
56
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 52122 (The truth is that
a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a
school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic
or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic
church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate
or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to
go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It
is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he
pleases, and when he pleases.).
57
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Courts decision invalidated a New York
state law setting maximum hours for bakers. Id. at 4546 & n.1, 64. The majority in Lochner
found that the law violated a liberty of contract, id. at 61, a theory later used to find many
otherwise lawful economic regulations unconstitutional. See generally David A. Strauss, Why
Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003) (explaining why Lochner was one of
the most widely reviled decision[s] of the last hundred years).
58
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 51821 (Black, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 522; see also NEWMAN, supra note 51, at 59192 (detailing Justice Blacks comments to his wife that he might begin his Tinker dissent by writing: It is a fine thing America
is going to the moon because the Supreme Court will have extended jurisdiction).
55
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[I]f the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools,
kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and
flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own
schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.60
While Justice Black did not win the argument in Tinker, he certainly established
a reoccurring frame of speech for debate: speech rights for public school students
versus control for school administrators and judicial deference to their decision
making authority. Following the spirit of Justice Blacks dissent, later Court decisions would erode the student right to expression established in Tinker. Tinker, heralded
by scholars as the most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights of students,61 served as the sole Court case in the area of student
speech rights for less than twenty years before two cases decided in the 1980s began
to erode the principles established in the iconic 1969 ruling. Those subsequent
decisions, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser62 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,63 were followed in 2007 by Morse v. Frederick,64 another Court decision
that limited free speech rights for students.
B. Bethel School District v. Fraser
In Fraser, a Pierce County, Washington, high school senior stood before an
assembly of 600 students to give a student government nominating speech65 that
veered into the patently sexual:
I know a man who is firmhes firm in his pants, hes firm in
his shirt, his character is firmbut most . . . of all, his belief in
you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.
If necessary, hell take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesnt
attack things in spurtshe drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finallyhe succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very endeven the climax,
for each and every one of you.
60

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: Whats Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 (2000).
62
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
63
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
65
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
61
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So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-presidenthell never come
between you and the best our high school can be.66
Some students yelled and lewdly gestured during Frasers speech, while others
seemed to be confused and embarrassed, according to a school counselor who attended
the assembly.67 The day after he gave his speech, Fraser was summoned to the assistant principals office and informed of his punishment: a three-day suspension and
the removal from a list of students being considered to speak at graduation.68 Upon
appealing his discipline, Fraser won in federal district court, as the court found that
the school violated his First Amendment rights.69 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit subsequently upheld the district courts decision, finding Frasers
sexually themed speech was indistinguishable from the armband protest in Tinker.70
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing administrators to censor
student speech that appeared to be lewd or indecent would only increase the risk of
cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper
speech and behavior in our public schools.71
The Supreme Court, however, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, reversed the Ninth Circuits decision and found Frasers punishment
to be constitutional, holding that [t]he First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondents would undermine the schools basic educational mission.72 While the
Court did not expressly state the decision was a break from precedent, Chief Justice
Burger distinguished the case from Tinker, citing the marked distinction between
Frasers speech and the nondisruptive, passive expression of Mary Beth Tinkers
armband.73 Chief Justice Burger also noted that the discipline imposed on Fraser was
unrelated to any political viewpoint unlike the punishment levied in Tinker.74 So
while Fraser would become an exception to the Tinker analysis, the Court was somewhat less than explicit in explaining how the two decisions would interact.75
In evaluating the merits of Frasers speech, the Chief Justice made a few points in
examining the fundamental nature of both schools and student expression. First, after
66

Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
Id. at 678.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 679.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 680 (quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir.
1985)).
72
Id. at 685.
73
Id. at 680.
74
Id. at 685.
75
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (The mode of analysis employed
in Fraser is not entirely clear.).
67
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noting that public schools function in part to train students for participation in democracy, Chief Justice Burger cited the notion that [t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools must be weighed against societys
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.76 This socially appropriate behavior that schools should instill in their
students includes consideration for all sensibilities in [e]ven the most heated political
discourse, according to Chief Justice Burger, who cited a litany of various House
and Senate rules governing member decorum to support his proposition.77
Second, after citing Cohen v. California78 and its protection of possibly offensive
expression in the public square, the Chief Justice noted that speech rights are not always
the same between adults and students: It does not follow . . . that simply because
the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making
what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to
children in a public school.79 Thus, according to the Court, the First Amendment
gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinkers armband, but not
Cohens jacket.80
Finally, Chief Justice Burger concluded the majority opinion by focusing extensively on a paternalistic need to protect students from the subject matter in Frasers
speech.81 The majority derided Fraser as a confused boy as it again endorsed a
schools right to determine whether essential lessons of civil, mature conduct can be
conveyed in an environment permissive to lewd and indecent speech.82 The Chief
Justice also wrote that Frasers speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students
and could be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only
14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.83 Finally, he cited
approvingly Ginsberg v. New York84 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation85 as cases representing limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching
an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may
76

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
Id. at 68182. As the Chief Justice concluded, Can it be that what is proscribed in the
halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate? Id. at 682. This assertion
fails to take into account that the rules governing conduct in Congress are determined by the
membership and subject to amendment. No such situation exists in public schools.
78
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft to be protected
speech under the First Amendment).
79
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
80
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
81
See id. at 68386 (The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.).
82
Id. at 683.
83
Id.
84
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
85
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
77
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include children and an endorsement of the states interest in protecting minors
from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.86
Ultimately, Fraser stands for the proposition that school administrators can move
to censor student speech they find to be lewd or offensive and that, furthermore, this
censorship need not be premised on the presence or threat of a disruption. Often,
lower courts have interpreted this authority to act against vulgar or offensive speech
broadly in giving schools the ability to censor any student speech found to be objectionable; other courts have interpreted Fraser more narrowly, upholding the constitutionality of school discipline only where student speech was sponsored by the school
in some way.87 The lack of disruption in Fraser88 and the subsequent constitutionality of the schools actions makes the case an exception to the Tinker standard;
whether Fraser was truly an exception would be a matter of debate as the Court
carved yet another way out of the Tinker analysis in its next student speech case.
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
School administrative authority to censor student speech would broaden with the
Courts 1988 decision in Hazelwood.89 The facts in the case center on a dispute
between a principal and student journalists working for Hazelwood East High Schools
Spectrum, a newspaper that was produced as a part of the Missouri schools journalism
curriculum.90 Before each issue was published, standard procedure dictated that the
papers faculty advisor submit page proofs to the high schools principal for prior
approval.91 Three days before the publication of the final issue of the school year, the
86

See id. at 68485.
See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts Inconsistent Treatment of
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 191
(2002) (However, recent developments in the lower courts show the Fraser decision may
do more to curtail the rights Tinker recognized than Hazelwood. The problem originates in
the way Fraser is interpreted by some lower courts. The issue that has caused a split in the First
Amendments application is whether Fraser allows schools to censor any speech deemed
vulgar or offensive (broad reading), or whether Fraser only allows the regulation of speech
that is sponsored by the school (narrow reading).).
88
In the majority opinion, scant evidence is cited for the proposition that the speech disrupted the operation of the school. During the speech, some in the audience hooted and
yelled while others simulated the acts Fraser referenced, and the day after the speech, one
teacher felt compelled to discuss the speech with her class. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. Still, there
is no sign the speech was disruptive in a way that would satisfy the Tinker standard, even
though Justice William Brennan argued in his concurring opinion the case was easily decided
under Tinker. See id. at 68790 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 6675 and
accompanying text. Perhaps this point was best addressed by a rule in the Bethel High School
disciplinary code: Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. Fraser, 478
U.S. at 678. For the majority, Frasers speech was disruptive simply as a matter of course.
89
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
90
Id. at 262.
91
Id. at 263.
87
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principal found fault with two stories: one on students and teenage pregnancy and
another on students dealing with divorced parents.92 In the principals judgment, the
students in the pregnancy story might have found their privacy compromised, even
with the papers decision to use pseudonyms; while in the story dealing with divorce,
the principal thought that the parents written about were not given the opportunity
to respond to unflattering comments.93 After considering the time frame and with the
end of the year nearing, the principal decided to simply withhold from publication
the two pages containing the stories rather than seek changes to their content.94
Student editors unhappy with the principals decision then sued, arguing that their
First Amendment rights had been violated.95 The district court, however, concluded
the principals actions were justified in light of the schools educational function.96
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding Spectrum to be a public forum that could be
censored only under Tinkers material and substantial interference standard.97 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld the principals censorship, choosing to make a distinction between Tinker and situations where a school
is called to sponsor student expression in some way.98
In writing for the majority, Justice Byron White first considered the legacy of
Tinkerthat [s]tudents in the public schools do not shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate99in light of the Courts
decision in Fraser, citing from that case both the idea that student speech rights can
be limited and that courts should defer to school administrative decisions. 100
In concluding the censorship was constitutionally permissible, Justice White
quickly dismissed the Eighth Circuits public forum determination. As he found, [t]he
public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.101
Instead of a square, park, or other type of historically recognizable public forum, Justice
White argued, Spectrum was a tightly controlled environment where the advisor picked
the papers editors, picked publication dates, assigned stories to those taking the
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. at 26364.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 265.
98
Id. at 27273.
99
Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
100
See id. at 26667.
101
Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content
and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.L.REV. 1219, 122021 (1984) (explaining
differences in traditional, designated, and nonpublic forums).
93
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schools Journalism II class, edited stories, and worked with the printing company.102
That level of control evidenced a purpose to create a supervised learning experience
for journalism students, rather than a public forum, according to Justice White.103
Justice White then distinguished Hazelwood from Tinker, with the former being
a question of whether a school must affirmatively . . . promote particular student
speech and the latter simply being a matter of whether a school must tolerate particular student speech.104 This first category is exempt from the material and substantial disruption standard because, as Justice White concluded, what was articulated
in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not
also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression.105
Thus, the schools level of control over the newspaper and its integration with
the curriculum both set the facts of Hazelwood outside the realm of Tinker and allowed
school officials a greater degree of control over a particular subset of student speech.
In defining what is to be considered part of a schools curriculum, Justice White cited
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school that must be supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.106
Control over this form of curriculum-based, sponsored student expression is easily
justifiable, according to Justice White:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.107
Under the Hazelwood standard, administrators can silence all sponsored speech
that would fall under the Tinker rubric as well as speech that is . . . ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or
unsuitable for immature audiences.108 Given the facts of the case, Justice White
focused on the immature audiences issue as he cautioned that schools must be able
to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience where student
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 27071.
Id. at 27273.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
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speech on sensitive topics like divorce and teen pregnancyis concerned.109 Hazelwoods
holding, though, is premised on the educational and supervisory nature of the relationship between the school and the newspaper in addition to giving schools the
ability to distance themselves from student speech that might be unfairly attributed
to the administration.110
Overall, the Courts holding is broad and grants a great deal of latitude where administrators and teachers act in the interest of legitimate pedagogical concerns,111 and
that leeway only increases when courts defer to administrators in determining what is
a valid pedagogical purpose.112 Still, this authority must be read in light of the requirement that speech subject to Hazelwood oversight must bear the schools imprimatur
in addition to being supervised by faculty with some attached learning component.
D. Morse v. Frederick
Morse,113 the Courts most recent student speech decision, came in 2007 after
a nearly two-decade silence on the issue. In Morse, high school students were dismissed
from class in order to watch the 2002 Olympic torch relay as it passed through Juneau,
109

Id. at 272.
See Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student
Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L.REV. 1555, 156061 (2003) (The
Court cited two primary justifications for the heightened interest of school authorities when
student speech is school-sponsored. First, the educational context of the speechincluding
involvement of faculty members and the pursuit of educational objectives in the sponsored
activityimplicates the schools custodial and tutelary responsibilities more directly. Second,
a schools promotion of speech introduces the possibility that the expression will be attributed
to the school itself. Speech that bears the imprimatur of the school resembles official speech,
leaving the school free to employ reasonable measures to guard against misattribution. Because of the educational context and the perception of imprimatur, Hazelwood authorizes regulation of school-sponsored speech so long as the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273)). But see
Adam Hoesing, School Sponsorship and Hazelwoods Protection of Student Speech:
Appropriate for All Curriculum Contexts?, NEB.L.REV.BULL.(July 24, 2012), http://lawreview
bulletin.unl.edu/?p=989#foot_src_o (But the Court did not emphasize the teachers control.
Instead, the Court focused on how the speech affected the public perception, i.e., whether the
public could reasonably believe the school supported or ratified the speech. (footnote omitted)).
111
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ([E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.).
112
Jordan, supra note 110, at 1555; see also Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, The
Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
379, 396 (1995) (These courts accept the Supreme Courts recognition that school officials
must have broad discretion to pursue their primary educational mission of preparing children
for adulthood and full integration into society.).
113
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
110
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Alaska.114 One student, a senior named Joseph Frederick, was late to school that day
but on arrival met his friends on property across the street from Juneau-Douglas
High School to watch the torch relay.115 As torchbearers and the cameras passed the
students, Frederick and his friends unveiled their surprise for the day: a fourteenfoot banner reading BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.116 Principal Deborah Morse crossed
the street to demand the students take down their banner, and all but Frederick complied.117 Following the incident, Frederick was suspended for ten daysa punishment that was eventually reduced to eight days.118 Upon appealing his suspension on
First Amendment grounds, Fredericks claim was rejected by the district court, which
held that the school had the authority, if not the obligation to silence Fredericks prodrug speech at a gathering of students.119 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed, applying Tinker and reasoning that administrators had failed to show Fredericks speech
would cause a substantial disruption in the operation of the school.120
At the Supreme Court, the exact message of Fredericks banner became a key
issue in the case, as the majority settled on two possible meanings: either an imperative
to use illegal drugs or a celebration of illegal drug use.121 The precise meaning of the
two, however, was ultimately irrelevant to the majority since it found Fredericks
banner to be implicitly pro-drug and upheld his punishment on those grounds.122
In writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts attempted to bring order
to the Courts student speech jurisprudence by explaining the applicable principles
from both Fraser and Hazelwood.123 Fraser, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, was notable
for establishing both that student First Amendment rights are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings and that Tinker does not control
all student speech situations.124 According to the Chief Justice, Hazelwood was instructive in deciding Morse as it confirmed both of the underlying principles from
Fraser. Despite their usefulness, neither Fraser nor Hazelwood would become the
basis for the majoritys holding as Chief Justice Roberts expressly declined to extend
Frasers prohibition of indecent speech to cover pro-drug expression125 and found
114

Id. at 397.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 398.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 399.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 402.
122
Id. at 403.
123
See id. at 40406.
124
Id. at 40405 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
125
See id. at 409 (Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Fredericks speech is proscribable because it is plainly offensive as that term is used in Fraser. We think this stretches
Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some
definition of offensive. After all, much political and religious speech might be perceived as
115
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that Hazelwood was similarly inapplicable as no reasonable observer would believe
Fredericks banner bore the schools imprimatur.126
In holding for Principal Morse, the Court focused on the dangers posed by illegal
drug use; Chief Justice Roberts cited survey statistics showing that many middle and
high school students have either used or sold drugs.127 The danger posed by illicit
substances, in addition to a schools obligation to protect students, thus took the
facts in Morse out of the Tinker framework, as the majority concluded:
Tinker warned that schools may not prohibit student speech because of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
or a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The danger
here is far more serious and palpable. The particular concern to
prevent student drug abuse at issue here, embodied in established school policy, extends well beyond an abstract desire to
avoid controversy.128
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, authored a concurring opinion to state explicitly his belief that the majoritys holding in Morse goes
no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and . . . provides no support
for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue.129 Justice Alito explained that he was wary of any interpretation of the majority opinion that would allow for the censorship of student speech
contrary to a schools educational mission, and he disclaimed any such interpretation
as dangerous and an abuse.130 Yet with a single paragraph, he encouraged lower
courts to enable school administrators to act with broad authority to censor student
speech in regard to school safety:
[A]ny argument for altering the usual free speech rules in the
public schools cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must
instead be based on some special characteristic of the school
setting. The special characteristic that is relevant in this case is
the threat to the physical safety of students. School attendance
can expose students to threats to their physical safety that they
would not otherwise face. Outside of school, parents can attempt
offensive to some. The concern here is not that Fredericks speech was offensive, but that it was
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. (citation omitted)).
126
Id. at 405.
127
Id. at 407.
128
Id. at 40809 (citations omitted).
129
Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 423.
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to protect their children in many ways and may take steps to
monitor and exercise control over the persons with whom their
children associate. Similarly, students, when not in school, may be
able to avoid threatening individuals and situations. During school
hours, however, parents are not present to provide protection and
guidance, and students movements and their ability to choose the
persons with whom they spend time are severely restricted. Students may be compelled on a daily basis to spend time at close
quarters with other students who may do them harm. Experience
shows that schools can be places of special danger.131
While Justice Alitos opinion was only a concurrence and any point he had to make
in regard to school violence was certainly dicta, those inherent limitations have not
stopped lower courts from using the Justices opinion in violent student speech cases.
Despite the language of the majority opinion that attempted to limit the decisions
scope, lower courts have begun to use the opinion to censor speech that has absolutely nothing to do with illegal drug use but that has everything to do with subjects
such as violence and homophobic expression.132 As one scholar argued, in the wake
of lower court interpretation, there is widespread disagreement on what Morse means
and how it should be applied, or even to which school speech cases it should be applied.133 The expansion of Morse beyond what was perhaps its intended scope can
be blamed primarily on the language and assortment of opinions generally, Justice
Alitos concurring opinion specifically, and the lingering concerns regarding school
safety after Columbine and other acts of school violence.134
131

Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 3; see, e.g., id. at 24 ([S]ome judges are willing to expansively view the Supreme Courts ruling in Morse beyond its factual underpinnings
and, in doing so, to extend its logic and reasoning to support the censorship of speech threatening
physical violence and expression causing emotional injury. Thus, the issue arises whether there
are any limits on just how far these or other courts may go in stretching Morse beyond the realm
of speech advocating the use of illegal drugs.); Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One
Year Later: New Limitations on Student Speech and the Columbine Factor, 42 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 427, 438 (2009) ([Morse] has been stretched far beyond the original exception based
on speech about illegal drugs to exceptions based on illegal conduct, school safety, and perhaps
even a so called psychological exception.); Ronald C. Schoedel III, Comment, Morse v.
Frederick: Tinkering with School Speech: Can Five Years of Inconsistent Interpretation Yield a
Hybrid Content-Effects-Based Approach to School Speech as a Tool for the Prevention of School
Violence?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2012) (questioning whether the central holding of
Morse can spread outside of drug-related speech after lower courts interpreted the cases broadly);
id. at 1645 (Lower courts are sharply divided over the breadth of the Morse holding, with much
of the confusion ensuing shortly after the issuance of the Morse opinion.).
133
Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1645.
134
See, e.g., Newcombe, supra note 132, at 427 (arguing that the expansion of Morse has two
chief causes: the Courts opinion and the Columbine factor); Emily Gold Waldman, A PostMorse Framework for Students Potentially Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L.
132
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As members of the Court came to divergent viewpoints regarding the scope and
effect of the majoritys decision even as the justices were in the process of handing
down the decision in Morse, it is not surprising that the federal courts of appeals . . .
have reached varying interpretations of the Morse holding and its impact on school
administrators authority.135 Chief Justice John Roberts commanded a thin five-vote
majority of himself and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy,
and Samuel Alito.136 However, Justice Thomas agreed in the result only to weaken
Tinker,137 and Justices Alito and Kennedy wrote to say they only supported the majority
decision so far as it enabled the censorship of apolitical pro-drug speech.138 Thus with
the fractured Court, the majority opinion was robbed of much of its clarity and intellectual force as it failed to either overturn or strongly reaffirm the Tinker principle.139
Furthermore, the seeds for student censorship were planted clearly on the face of the
Courts decision as it embraced four propositions that could be used to argue for narrowed student speech rights: a new exception for student speech rather than an existing
standard (meaning that additional exceptions could be created), student safety as a
compelling reason for censorship, political speech as an important factor in the constitutionality of censorship, and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.140
Another key factor in the expansion of Morse is Justice Alitos concurring opinion.
Justice Alito likely thought his opinion would make it clear Morse was limited to the
censorship of speech about illegal drugs and nothing more.141 Yet in writing his opinion,
he stressed that schools disciplinary authority must be tied to the special characteristics of the school environmentciting the physical safety of students as specifically
& EDUC. 463, 48991 (2008) (contending that the Morse opinion set the stage for an
expansive interpretation).
135
Richard Howell, Note and Comment, After Morse v. Frederick: The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Takes Another Step Toward Abrogating the Tinker Standard
for Student Speech By Permitting Restrictions on Speech Which Poses a Special Danger
to the School Environment, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1046, 1058 (2008).
136
Justice Stephen Breyer concurred in the result, as he believed the case should have been
decided in favor of Morse on the question of qualified immunity alone. See Clay Calvert,
Qualified Immunity and the Trials and Tribulations of Online Student Speech: A Review of
Cases and Controversies from 2009, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 86, 9092 (2009) (explaining
Justice Breyers argument that qualified immunity protects principals who discipline students
for online speech).
137
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 349, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (I write separately
to state my view that the standard set forth in Tinker . . . is without basis in the Constitution.).
138
Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
139
Jay Braiman, Note, A New Case, an Old Problem, a Teachers Perspective: The Constitutional Rights of Public School Students, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 441 (2009). As Braiman
argued, [t]he case, disappointingly, brings us no closer to understanding what the difference
is, or what it should be, between the free speech rights of students in school and those of everyone else, everywhere else, in America. Id.
140
Waldman, supra note 134, at 48991.
141
Newcombe, supra note 132, at 438.
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relevant;142 his mere mention of school safety as an issue for consideration resulted in
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh, Second, and Fifth Circuits
broadly interpreting Morse to support censorship when safety might be a concern.143
These courts, with help from Justice Alitos opinion, have construed Morse as providing a new type of exigent-circumstances exception from the stringent strictures of
Tinker144 in effect, ripp[ing] the narrow concurring opinion of Justices Alito and
Kennedy from its factual moorings.145 The broadest interpretation of Morseone that
sees the case about safety and danger broadly146 and grants school administrators a great
deal of deference147has five logical steps according to Professor Clay Calvert:
1. Schools, ideally, should be safe havens from physical dangers, yet in reality they can be, as Justice Alito wrote, places of
special danger.
2. Illegal drugs pose one such special danger; as Justice Alito
reasoned, illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways
unique threat to the physical safety of students.
3. Drugs are not, however, the only threat to the physical safety
of students in public school settings.
4. After the deadliest school massacre in the nations history
at Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado, and subsequent school shootings like the one in March 2001 in Santee,
California, there is a palpable danger to the physical safety of
students posed by the violent conduct of fellow classmates.
5. Thus, if speech advocating illegal drug use can be squelched
under Morse without having to jump through the legal hoops of
Tinker, then speech that appears to advocate or threaten violence
against other students can similarly be stifled under Morse.148
Since it inadvertently provided the foundation for new limitations on student
speech, Justice Alitos opinion has possibly become as important as the majoritys
carefully crafted and narrow holding.149 Despite the importance it has attained in lower
courts, some scholars fault the opinion for failing to clearly state when a safety and
142

Fox, supra note 9, at 454.
Id. at 453.
144
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 7.
145
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
146
Id. at 7.
147
Fox, supra note 9, at 469; see also Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1645 (Courts since
Morse have determined that deference to school authorities can now be given based on something widerbut how much wider varies from court to court.).
148
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
149
Newcombe, supra note 132, at 439 (emphasis omitted).
143
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security exigency mandates an exemption from the Tinker standard,150 while others
simply label Justice Alitos talk of school safety as dicta.151 Ultimately, if Justice
Alito had truly intended both for Morse to be a narrow holding and for his opinion
to thusly confine the majority opinion to the facts of the case, he might not have
written so much, as Professor Calvert succinctly opined.152
One final reason for the expansion of Morseand perhaps the underpinning of
Justice Alitos fears in his concurring opinionis the continued apprehension of
school violence in the aftermath of Columbine and other acts of school violence. Where
student speech is concerned, as Caroline Newcombe argued, Columbine introduced
the possibility that expression will become action, thereby necessitating a broad interpretation of Morse that allows for administrators to effectively address student safety
issues.153 Indeed, as Professor Calvert resignedly concluded, [W]hen courts in the
near future grapple with student speech referencing violence and violent conduct,
the early indications from post-Morse cases . . . are that judges will read Morse in
the lugubriously long shadows cast by the tragedy at Columbine High School.154
For those in favor of curbing speech rights, post-Morse student speech has become
a trap for the unwary school administrator as they cannot fashion the sort of comprehensive school speech policy that will best meet the needs of their school without
quite possibly running afoul of one of the various limits imposed on the reading of
Morse.155 Jay Braiman argued even more strongly against Morse and what he saw
as its inherent permissiveness, stating the decision enables students to continue
flouting and defying school authority by characterizing conduct, which would be
150

Howell, supra note 135, at 1062 (describing the current state of the law as ambiguous
as to when Tinker can be skipped in favor of Morse).
151
See Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 6 (Justice Alito suggested in dicta
in Morse that Tinker still controlled in situations involving the potential for in-school violence,
as he wrote that school officials must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads
to violence. And, in most cases, Tinkers substantial disruption standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence erupts.); see also id. at 10 (arguing that Justice Alito
did not draft or craft a standard for those cases not covered by Tinker where violent expression is concerned, and if he had, it would have been dicta as Morse had nothing to do with
violent expression). But see Fox, supra note 9, at 470 (suggesting a legal framework for the
Morse exigency standard where once the school initiates emergency action and has time to
adequately assess the threat, any additional action must arise from a determination that: (1)
the speech may still reasonably be regarded as posing a threat of physical harm, and thus, disciplinary action is in furtherance of a compelling interest per Morse; or (2) such facts exist allowing the school to reasonably forecast substantial disruption within the school under Tinker).
152
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 9. As Professor Calvert continued, [h]ad
Justice Alito simply stated his conclusion in the case and left it at that, rather than attempting
to explain it, there would be little legal ground for . . . appellate courts . . . to assert and claim
that his opinion supports school efforts to punish students for violent-themed writings. Id.
153
Newcombe, supra note 132, at 453; see also id. (It is this contextual factor [of school
violence] that should be acknowledged and put into a principled framework of analysis.).
154
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 34.
155
Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1663.
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unacceptable and unjustifiable in any other context, as protected expression.156 Yet
for scholars supportive of student expression, the decision might well provide the
legal tool that school administrators need to squelch all manners, modes and varieties of student speech that portend harm, be it physical . . . or psychological157 even
as the central thesis key to the majoritys holdingthat Fredericks banner would
have encouraged drug use among studentsremains a questionable proposition.158
To the further dismay of pro-speech scholars is the simple reality that [a]s courts
expand the scope and power of Morse, they contract and reduce the force of Tinker.159
Few, it seems, are content with the Supreme Courts most recent student speech
decision. Ultimately, Morse represents something of a failure for clarity in the development of the law as it has done little to clarify free-speech jurisprudence in the
realm of public schools160 and neither affirmed nor rejected Tinker as a continuing
and relevant standard.161 Whether the Court will take up student speech again certainly
remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: If the Court chooses to address the bounds
of student expression, it will be stepping back into a murky area of the law, and its
decision will likely leave all parties unhappy.
II. SURVEY OF VIOLENT NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR STUDENT SPEECH CASES
This Part will survey both the factual background and current legal analysis of
violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases. Generally speaking, these cases
involve student speech that is deeply curricular in naturemeaning that it is engrained
into the learning process and therefore outside the proper boundaries of Tinkerbut
the expression does not bear the official seal of school sponsorship, which places these
cases outside of Hazelwood as well.162 Thus these cases represent a distinct subset of
student speech requiring its own, specific analysis.
156

Braiman, supra note 139, at 442. But cf. Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public
Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 593 (2002) (Just
as it protects the rights of criminals against a powerful government and an unsympathetic popular
majority, the Constitution protects parents and children from a government that forces children
to attend school and from a popular majority that might not respect the way some students
and parents choose to live.).
157
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 28.
158
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The Deference
to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 295 (2013) ([I]t is hard to believe that any student
in the school, the smartest or the slowest, would be more likely to use illegal drugs just because of the banner that Frederick held up.).
159
Clay Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2009) [hereinafter Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis]; see also id.
at 1169 (arguing that Tinker faces a new problem of being overshadowed by Morse and
being used only in situations where cases mirror or closely parallel its facts).
160
Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 33.
161
Braiman, supra note 139, at 441.
162
See infra Part II.B for discussion of why current Supreme Court jurisprudence fails to
address the category of non-sponsored curricular student speech.
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A. Common Factual Situations in Violent Non-Sponsored Curricular Speech Cases
The majority of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases arose after
a student turned in a class assignment with violent themes or content. These assignments, in turn, were either some form of artistic expression163 or fictional stories.164
Artistic expression in these cases include the painted portrayal of a police officer
being shot,165 a drawing of a school surrounded by explosives in addition to the
school districts superintendent shown with a gun to his head,166 an experimental art
project focusing on the fictional need to take vengeance on a dog killer,167 and fifthgrader Cuffs wish to [b]low up the school with the teachers in it as depicted as
a crayon-scrawled wish written on a drawing of an astronaut.168 Fictional stories in
these cases include graphic and fanciful depictions of violence and sex, 169 an essay
on a students last twenty-four hours of life,170 and a story detailing a teachers decapitation.171 The commonality between the seven, however, is that they were all
created either during regular coursework or they were produced at the behest of a
teacher, as in Demers v. Leominster School Department,172 a case in which a student
was told to draw his feelings and was subsequently disciplined for his creation that
depicted the school surrounded by explosives.173
The categoryof non-sponsored curricular speech is broader than class assignments.
In Emmett v. Kent School District,174 a student was suspended for a website created
off-campus that contained mock obituaries of his classmates.175 The pedagogical
implication in Emmett is that the student was inspired to create the obituaries on his
163

See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2012)
(crayon drawing of an astronaut with a written wish to blow up the school); Demers ex rel.
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 19899 (D. Mass. 2003) (drawing of a
school building with explosives); Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (poster making threats to
whomever had killed the students dog); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (painting of a child shooting a police officer).
164
See, e.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (fictional essay about drug abuse and suicide); D.F. ex rel. Finkle v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp.
2d 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (fictional story about a student who stabs and decapitates his
fellow students); In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 73031 (Wis. 2001) (fictional story
about a student who decapitates his teacher).
165
In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19697.
166
Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 19899.
167
Boman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *2.
168
Cuff, 677 F.3d at 111.
169
D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d. at 123.
170
Cox v. Warwich Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2011).
171
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 73031 (Wis. 2001).
172
263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003).
173
Id. at 19899.
174
92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
175
Id. at 1089.
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website after a creative writing class.176 While the connection to coursework is not as
strong as the previously mentioned examples, it still implies a serious tie to education and represents expression that should be fostered as part of the learning process.
The best example of student speech that should be encouraged as part of the
educational processand therefore representing non-sponsored curricular speechwas
seen in LaVine v. Blaine School District.177 In LaVine, a student presented his English
teacher with a poem describing a school shooting.178 This poem was not given to the
teacher as a threat or for a grade; rather, the student simply wanted feedback from his
teacher in order to improve his writing.179 This type of speech ties directly to the heart
of a schools educational mission and represents all of the learning interests implicated
in Hazelwood. Therefore, such speech should be considered part of a schools curriculum no matter who commissioned it or whether it was turned in to an instructor.
While there are clear factual similarities among these cases, there is also one key
distinction: Although many students and guardians seek redress in the courts for
school discipline in these cases, some students, such as those in In re Ryan D. and
In re Douglas D., were appealing adverse decisions in criminal juvenile proceedings. The student speech at issue in these juvenile proceedings was still similar, but,
as Part II.B will detail, the legal analysis tended to be different, focusing less on
student speech jurisprudence and more on an examination of whether the students
speech represented a true threat.
B. Common Legal Analysis of Violent Non-Sponsored Curricular Speech Cases
While the facts are remarkably similar in these cases, the legal analysis employed
by courts to determine the constitutionality of disciplinary action taken by schools or
other state actors against students varies greatly. Several courts turned to Tinker to
address the issue, but it has not been the exclusive means of analysis. Some courts rely
on true threat analysis and state case law while others use a means of analysis that
is simply unclear.
1. Cases Using Tinker Analysis
For example, in LaVine, the Ninth Circuit eliminated both Fraser and Hazelwood
before settling on Tinker as controlling law180 when an eleventh-grade student was
suspended a total of seventeen days for his poem titled Last Words.181 As the court
176

Id.
257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
178
Id. at 98384.
179
Id. at 984.
180
Id. at 98889.
181
Id. at 983. The most relevant part of the poem described the narrators actions as follows:
As I appro[a]ched, the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door, Bang, Bang,
Bang-Bang. When it all was over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not fe[e]ling, any
remor[s]e, for I felt, I was cle[a]nsing my soul. . . . Id.
177
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reasoned in a decision six years prior to the Supreme Courts ruling in Morse, the
poem was not vulgar, lewd, obscene or plainly offensive, therefore placing it outside the boundaries of Fraser.182 Likewise, it was not suited to be decided under
Hazelwood as no members of the public could have reasonably believed that the
poem bore the imprimatur of the school as the poem was only shown to the students
teacher and friends, it was not published in a school publication, and [i]t was not
an assignment.183 Tinker was appropriate, as the Ninth Circuit determined, because
it simply covered all other speech not governed by Fraser or Hazelwood.184 This
conclusion, however, ignores the facts of Tinker185 and arbitrarily characterizes it as
a default means of addressing student speech cases, thereby foreclosing any serious
inquiry into the educational issues in LaVine.
The LaVine courts reasoning did not improve as it applied Tinkers material
and substantial disruption standard. After first noting the school had a duty to prevent
any potential violence on campus to either the student poet or others, the Ninth Circuit
found the school had a reasonable basis for its decision to suspend the student based
on his troubled home environment, stalking allegations in regard to his girlfriend,
school absences, and past disciplinary issues.186 And that was all before getting to the
analysis of the poem:
Last, and maybe most importantly, there was the poem itself.
Last Words is filled with imagery of violent death and suicide.
At its extreme it can be interpreted as a portent of future violence,
of the shooting of James fellow students. Even in its most mild
interpretation, the poem appears to be a cry for help from a
troubled teenager contemplating suicide. Taken together and given
the backdrop of actual school shootings, we hold that these circumstances were sufficient to have led school authorities reasonably
to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
182

Id. at 989.
Id. This suggests the Ninth Circuit may have at least considered an argument for the case
being decided under Hazelwood if the poem had been a class assignment rather than something
undertaken by a student on his own initiative. This conclusion, however, ignores what the educational process should be and risks a chilling effect on students seeking advice on their own
creations outside of the classroom.
184
Id.
185
Tinker, at its core, addresses independent student speech that simply happens to take place
on the grounds of a public school. The anti-war armbands worn by the students in the case had
nothing to do with coursework or the mission of the school. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (noting that the decision to wear black armbands
was made by community members and students in a house meeting). Instead, this expression
was distinctly apart from anything associated with the school or the learning environment.
Assuming that Tinker is a broad catch-all for anything not covered by Fraser, Hazelwood,
or Morse is simply incorrect.
186
LaVine, 257 F.3d at 98990.
183

2015]

NEITHER TINKER, HAZELWOOD, FRASER, NOR MORSE

811

school activitiesspecifically, that James was intending to inflict
injury upon himself or others.187
Thus for the Ninth Circuit the possible disruption that made the students suspension
constitutional was not any fear or unease caused by the poem in the student body;
rather, it was the idea that the student was going to come to class and harm himself or
others as portrayed in the poem. Tinker, however, was not intended to operate in such
a way as it allows schools to act only where a substantial disruption results from the
speech itself and not any action possibly predicted in the speech.188 In short, since
the poem could not cause a school shooting or any other incident of violence, the Ninth
Circuits analysis failed to truly account for how the Tinker standard should operate.
Furthermore, in referencing the students issues at home and his various disciplinary transgressions, the Ninth Circuit conflated Tinker with an examination of
whether the student was a threat to the student body instead of an evaluation of the
poems potential to cause a disruption at the school. In inquiring as to the nature of the
students behavior, the Ninth Circuit was conducting something more akin to a true
threat analysis, something the court itself had determined was not germane given the
finding that the schools actions were justified.189
In Cuff, the Second Circuit did not undertake a lengthy determination of what
standard to apply when a student wrote of a wish that his school and all of its
teachers be blown up; rather, it simply stated general principles from Tinker190 in light
of Hazelwoods subsequent narrowing of student speech rights without mentioning
Fraser or Morse.191 In applying Tinker, the court cautioned that the test does not require administrators to prove an actual disruption or that substantial disruption was
inevitable.192 Instead, as the Second Circuit determined, the test in Tinker is an objective standard based on the reasonableness of the schools determination that a
disruption was likely to occur as a result of student expression.193 Finally, the Second
187

Id. at 990.
See Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (Pooler,
J., dissenting).
189
See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 n.5 (The school argues that James poem was a true
threat and not protected by the First Amendment at all. Because we conclude that even if the
poem was protected speech, the schools actions were justified, we need not resolve this issue.
(citation omitted)).
190
The relevant principles from Tinker, according to the Second Circuit, include the oftrepeated line that students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate; that schools cannot censor speech solely on the basis of
an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance; and that administrators must show
their actions were based on something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Cuff, 677 F.3d at 11213
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 50809).
191
Id. at 11213.
192
Id. at 113.
193
Id.
188
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Circuit singled out expression in the context of student speech favoring violent
conduct as an area where courts should not attempt to determine how school officials should respond.194 These administrators, as the court contended, are in the best
position to assess the potential for harm and act accordingly and should be afforded
deference where violent speech is concerned.195
In applying Tinker to the facts of the case and concluding that it was reasonably foreseeable that the astronaut drawing could create a substantial disruption at
the school, the Cuff courtmuch like the Ninth Circuit in LaVinenoted that the
student involved had a history of disciplinary issues.196 The court also pointed out
that other students had seen B.C.s astronaut drawing and that one student was very
worried about the drawing.197 Additionally, the court wrote that B.C.s lack of capacity
or intention to carry out his wish was irrelevant198thus similarly conflating Tinker
with a threat analysis as the Ninth Circuit did in LaVine. The Second Circuit also noted
that [c]ourts have allowed wide leeway to school administrators disciplining students
for writings or other conduct threatening violence as it cited to LaVine and several
other violent student expression cases.199
The Cuff court, however, broke from the analysis as seen in LaVine to discuss exactly how the astronaut drawingrather than any violent actcould disrupt the school
community.200 Sharing the drawing with other students aggravated the threat of substantial disruption, according to the Second Circuit, and was therefore an act reasonably perceived as an attention-grabbing device.201 If students decided to copy B.C.s
actions, the court reasoned such reproduction might then have led to a substantial
decrease in discipline, an increase in behavior distracting students and teachers from the
educational mission, and tendencies to violent acts.202 Furthermore, once parents became aware of the astronaut drawing and the schools hypothetical lack of a response
this could have resulted in a decline of parental confidence in school safety with many
negative effects such as the need to hire security personnel and even a decline in
194

Id.
Id. On the matter of deference, the Cuff court cited Fraser approvingly, quoting specifically the Supreme Courts argument that [t]he determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom . . . is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. Id. (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
196
Id. at 11314.
197
Id. at 114.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
See id. at 11415; see also id. at 122 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ([T]he question under
Tinker is whether this boys speech itself had the potential to cause a disruption at school,
not whether the drawing might have predicted that B.C. was planning an attack. . . . Tinker
requires a causal link between the speech that school officials want to suppress and the
substantial disruption that they wish to avoid.).
201
Id. at 114.
202
Id. at 11415.
195
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enrollment.203 Thus, as the Second Circuit found, the school could reasonably have
concluded that the astronaut drawing would disrupt the school environment, making
B.C.s suspension constitutional.204
So while the Cuff court did not make the same mistake of confusing a school
shooting or other violence with the possible disruption resulting from student speech
as the Ninth Circuit did in LaVine, the errors in the courts reasoning are still readily
apparent. By speculating as to what might happen if the school did not act to punish the
astronaut drawing or by aggregating the effects of many similar drawings, the court
sanctioned the very undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance that the
Supreme Court cautioned against in Tinker.205 Admittedly, the Tinker test does not
require proof of an actual disturbance or that the feared disturbance was a certainty
in the absence of school action.206 But to hold that the Tinker test is satisfied by the mere
possibility that students in the aggregate may cause the slow demise of school discipline
is to reduce the standard to nothingness, and Des Moines, Iowa, school administrators
would likely have made the same argument in Tinker. As Circuit Judge Rosemary
Pooler rightly pointed out in her dissenting opinion in Cuff, [S]ome disruptionsand
perhaps some far more substantial than the one at issue in this casemust no doubt
be tolerated, lest the slightest flicker of frustration or fear in a classmate could justify
sanctioning a students speech.207 In short, the Tinker test does not require the moral
certainty of a disruption for administrators to act, but it requires more than what was
deemed acceptable by the Second Circuit in Cuff.
Other courts have also applied Tinker in cases of violent non-sponsored curricular speech. In Demers, the federal district court of Massachusetts used Tinker and
a true threat analysis to uphold the suspension of an eighth-grade student who drew
both his school surrounded by explosives and the superintendent with a gun pointed
to his head.208 In applying Tinker to the facts, the court was quick to distinguish the
violent drawing from the anti-war armbands stating that the former was not silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.209
When the drawing was considered along with the student writing I want to die and
I hate life repeatedly on a piece of paper, the court concluded simply that a
reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly in the wake of increased school
violence across the country.210 This conclusion, however, was reached without any
203

Id. at 115.
Id.
205
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
206
See Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113.
207
Id. at 120 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
208
Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198 (D. Mass.
2003). The student was asked by a teacher to draw his feelings, therefore placing his speech
in the category of non-sponsored curricular speech.
209
Id. at 202 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
210
Id. at 20203.
204
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proof as to the potential for disturbance at the school. Again, this determination conflated the potential disruption caused by speech with the potential harm that would be
incurred as a result of actual school violence. Yet as the court found in Demers, it
would have been unthinkable for school officials not to act.211
Despite the outcomes in LaVine, Cuff, and Demers, the mere judicial determination that Tinker applies in a given case does not always foretell defeat for students in
violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases. In Boman v. Bluestem Unified School
District,212 the Federal District Court of Kansas granted a permanent injunction preventing school administrators from disciplining a student who created an abstract
art poster in class and then displayed it in a school hallway.213 The poster, unsigned
by the student, was a study on word repetition focusing on the death of a dog and a
promise of vengeance against the dogs killer;214 however, the dog, its death, and the
students violent thoughts were entirely fictional.215 Still, the student was suspended
for the rest of the school year pending a psychological exam.216
In issuing a permanent injunction against the students suspension, the federal
district judge alluded to Tinker when he wrote that once the circumstances surrounding the making of Ms. Bomans poster were understood by school officials,
there was no factual basis for believing that Ms. Boman had willfully violated any
school rule, caused a substantial disruption in the operation of the school, or invaded
the rights of other students.217 In assessing the potential disruption (or lack thereof)
caused by the poster, the judge cited the school principals quick reaction to the
poster as he first found out who created the artwork and then moved to determine
whether the student was a threat.218 No evidence was presented by the school to show
211

Id. at 203.
No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5297, at *11 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
213
Id.
214
The students poster contained the following text:
Please tell me who killed my dog. I miss him very much. He was my best
friend. I do miss him terribly. Did you do it? Did you kill my dog? Do you
know who did it? You do know, dont you? I know you know who did it.
You know who killed my dog. Ill kill you if you dont tell me who killed
my dog. Tell me who did it. Tell me. Tell me. Tell me. Please tell me
now. How could anyone kill a dog. My dog was the best. Mans best
friend. Who could shoot their best friend? Who? Dammit, Who? Who
killed my dog? Who killed him? Who killed my dog? Ill kill you all! You
all killed my dog. You all hated him. Who? Who are you that you could
kill my best friend? Who killed my dog?
Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5389, at *2 n.1 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (decision issuing preliminary injunction). The text was
written in a spiral that made it fairly difficult to read unless the poster was rotated. Id. at *2.
215
Id. at *4.
216
Id. at *7.
217
Boman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5297, at *34 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000) (decision issuing
permanent injunction).
218
Id. at *6.
212
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that any students believed the poster to be a real threat, and, as the judge concluded,
there was a similar lack of evidence to show a disruption in the school.219 The judge
also noted that the ancillary distractions caused by the students decision to file a lawsuitnamely upset parties in the community and her disgruntled friendscould not
serve as the factual evidence for a disruption under Tinker.220 Therefore, without any
proof of a disturbance, the students suspension was unconstitutional.
In finding for the student, however, the Boman court was careful to both limit the
applicability of its ruling and reaffirm the authority of school administrators.221 As
the judge wrote, the ruling did not in any way diminish the authority of school administrators to suspend students who willfully violate school rules or to punish those
students who cause a substantial disruption.222 Furthermore, the judge clarified that
his ruling applied only to the students poster and that it did not prevent future disciplinary action against any studentincluding the student plaintiff in the caseguilty
of violating a school rule.223 Finally, the judge offered that the permanent injunction
against the school did not prevent administrators from adopting appropriate rules or
policies concerning the posting of items on school property (including reasonable restraints on the location and manner of posting items), nor [did] it prohibit the school
from punishing students who willfully violate such rules.224 Thus, the judge carefully
crafted the ruling to both demonstrate a rigorous application of the Tinker test and to
point out possible alternatives to school administrators unhappy with the result in
the case.
In assessing how courts apply Tinker in cases of violent non-sponsored student
speech, a few points are clear. First, courts like the Ninth Circuit in LaVine may choose
to use Tinker in such instances simply because it appears reasonable as a default option.225 Second, courts are likely to entertain the possibility of school violence as a
disruption fulfilling the requirements of the Tinker standard even as this violates the
essence of the Supreme Courts holding in the case.226 Finally, even though some
courts, such as the district court in Boman, will conduct a serious inquiry into whether
there was an actual disruption or serious cause to fear one, many courts will likely engage in only a perfunctory or entirely speculative Tinker examination en route to
upholding school discipline.227
219

Id.
See id. at *7 n.2 (Although these things undoubtedly make operation of the school more
difficult, they do not constitute the type of disruption that would justify plaintiffs suspension
because they result from factors other than plaintiffs conduct in putting up her poster.).
221
See id. at *1011.
222
Id. at *10.
223
Id.
224
Id. at *1011.
225
See supra notes 18084 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 18689, 20811 and accompanying text.
227
See supra notes 190205 and accompanying text (discussing the speculative nature of
the Cuff courts analysis and the factual nature of the Boman courts analysis).
220
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2. Cases Using True Threat, State Case Law, and Other Means of Analysis
While Tinker tends to be a dominant lens through which to examine the issue of
violent non-sponsored curricular student speech, it is not the exclusive means of
analysis for courts as they also rely on true threat examination, state case law, and
other doctrines. For example, in Demers, the federal district court of Massachusetts
used both Tinker and the true threat doctrine to uphold the schools disciplinary
action [w]ithout deciding which standard [was] appropriate.228
In Demers, the district court judge first established the basics of the true threat
analysis as an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable person would interpret the alleged threat as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future
harm.229 He then observed the current circuit split regarding the true threat analysis
and the viewpoint of the statement.230 Some circuit courts have adopted a test that
examines whether speech should be interpreted as a threat by a reasonable speaker
while others use a reasonable listener standard.231 Controlling precedent in the First
Circuit suggested that the judge in Demers was required to apply a reasonable speaker
test, meaning that the focus of the true threat inquiry was whether the student reasonably should have foreseen that the drawing of his school surrounded by explosives
would cause others to fear harm.232 Under this standard, as the judge noted, there is
no requirement that the speaker had the ability or actually intended to carry out the
threat.233 Yet after laying out the basics of true threat analysis, the judge simply concluded with his determination that the student should have known that his drawing and
note would be considered a threat to the school and to himself.234 While it might have
been the case that a fifteen-year-old eighth grader235 could have taken national concerns
regarding school violence into account while drawing his picture and thus conclude that
others would be frightened, to simply pronouncewith no further analysisthat the
student should have understood the entirety of what he was doing is nothing more than
an ipse dixit.
While Demers involved the dual application of Tinker and the true threat doctrine,
juvenile court proceedings involving violent non-sponsored student speech turned
almost exclusively on state statutory and case law. In the case of In re Ryan D., a
228

Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. Mass.
2003). While seriously analyzing both Tinker and the true threat doctrine is more fundamentally
sound than simply using the former to both uphold school discipline and avoid discussion of
the latter, not deciding which standard is appropriate seems like an abrogation of the judges
central responsibility. Id.
229
Id. at 202.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. (quoting United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 149192 (1st Cir. 1997)).
233
Id. (citing Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 198.
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California Court of Appeal overturned a juvenile courts determination that a students
painting of a police officer being shot constituted a criminal threat.236 While the court
found that the paintingcreated as a response to an arrest for marijuana possession
and submitted as an assignment for an art classwas intemperate and demonstrated
extremely poor judgment, it did not convey a gravity of purpose and immediate
prospect of the execution of a threat to commit a crime that would result in death or
great bodily injury to the officer.237 In interpreting Section 422 of the California Penal
Code,238 the court noted that the statute required that potential threats be analyzed
in the greater context of how and where they were made.239 The court also made it
clear that, to be criminally proscribable under Section 422, the threat need not be personally communicated to the intended victim, but, as the court cautioned, the defendant must still at least intend for the threat to be conveyed to the victim. 240 To meet
the statutory definition of a criminal threat under state law, the court made it clear that
the process required the judicial system to balance the facts against each other to
determine whether, viewed in their totality, the circumstances are sufficient to meet the
requirement that the communication convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.241
In applying the law to the facts at hand, the court concluded that the painting failed
to convey a gravity of purpose along with the immediate prospect of a crime that
would result in death or great harm to the police officer depicted in the students
work.242 First, the court agreed that any painting as an expression of intention to do
harmeven a graphically violent painting, as the court pointed outis necessarily ambiguous.243 Alone, therefore, the court found that the painting could not represent a criminal threat.244 In examining the painting along with the totality of the
236

123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 196.
238
Section 422 of the California Penal Code punished any individual:
who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or
great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the
statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of
actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in
which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or
for his or her immediate familys safety . . . .
Id. at 19798 n.2.
239
Id. at 198.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242
Id.
243
Id. at 200.
244
Id.
237
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circumstances surrounding its creation, the court determined that the context of the
painting resolved the inherent ambiguity in favor of the student and against a finding
of an actual threat.245 The court then discussed several facts that served to mitigate
the presence of a criminal threat: the painting was turned in for a grade, 246 a month
passed between the students arrest and his submission of the painting, and the painting
lacked any notice of an intent to do harm with words such as this will be you, I do
have a gun, you know, or watch out.247 Furthermore, the court found that the actions
of school administrators suggested the painting was not a threat, as the students art
teacher found it to be disturbing and scary but she and an assistant principal who
also saw the painting did not call police.248
Most importantly for the students innocence, however, was the lack of any evidence that he had the specific intent that the painting be shown to the officer depicted
in it.249 As the court concluded, the evidence suggested that the student could have,
and perhaps even should have foreseen the possibility that the officer would learn of
the painting and see it.250 This mere possibility, though, was insufficient to establish the
specific intent necessary for criminal liability.
In concluding its opinion, the court noted the difficultyof balancing safety concerns
with the constitutional guarantee of free speech:
We certainly find no fault with the school authorities and the
police treating the matter seriously. The painting was a graphic,
if mythical, depiction of the brutal murder of [a police officer].
Without question, it was intemperate and demonstrated extremely
poor judgment. But the criminal law does not, and can not, implement a zero-tolerance policy concerning the expressive depiction of violence.251
Thus, the California Court of Appeal concluded that at least the states criminal
code must allow for the creative depiction of violence in a school setting, but it did
not speculate on whether school administrators could have disciplined the student
for the painting. With In re Douglas D., the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided
some measure of insight into the boundaries of criminal law and the application of
245

Id.
Id. As the court noted, simply turning in an assignment would be a rather unconventional
and odd means of communicating a threat, as [o]rdinarily, a person wishing to threaten
another would not do so by communicating with someone in a position of authority over the
person making the threat. Id.
247
See id. at 20001.
248
Id. at 201.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 20102.
246
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school discipline as it applied a state disorderly conduct statute and the true threat
doctrine to decide a case involving violent non-sponsored curricular speech.252
In the Wisconsin case, an eighth-grade English student was given a creative
writing assignment with no limit regarding the topic on which he was to write, and
other students would finish the assignment.253 Instead of beginning the assignment,
however, the student talked with friends and disrupted the class, upon which his
teacher sent him into the hall outside of the classroom to begin working. 254 At the
end of the class period, the student handed in the following short story:
There one lived an old ugly woman her name was Mrs. C
that stood for crab. She was a mean old woman that would beat
children sencless. I guess thats why she became a teacher.
Well one day she kick a student out of her class & he dint
like it. That student was named Dick.
The next morning Dick came to class & in his coat he conseled a machedy. When the teacher told him to shut up he whiped
it out & cut her head off.
When the sub came 2 days later she needed a paperclipp so
she opened the droor. Ahh she screamed as she found Mrs. C.s
head in the droor.255
The teacherwho often referred to herself as Mrs. C256believed the story to be
a threat against her if she again disciplined the student.257 After the class was dismissed, she informed the school principal, and the student was then called to the
assistant principals office, where he apologized and insisted the story was not a
threat.258 Despite his assertion, the student was given an in-school suspension and
moved to a different English class.259 Even with this school punishment already
handed down and no sign that the student was a continuing behavioral problem, police
filed a delinquency petition a month after the story was turned in alleging that the
student had engaged in abusive conduct under circumstances in which the conduct
tends to cause a disturbance, which was a violation of the Wisconsin state disorderly conduct statute.260
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73031 (all errors in original).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In applying the disorderly conduct statute261 to the short story in the case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court made some important preliminary determinations: pure
speech could be punished under the law,262 threatening speech in the school environment can cause a disruption irrelevant of the specific content,263 and that the lack of
an actual disruption was not dispositive to the outcome of the case.264 After the initial
findings, the only issue before the court was whether the students story was protected
speech under the First Amendment, since the court determined that Wisconsins disorderly conduct statute could only criminalize speech that was wholly without constitutional protection.265
In concluding that the story was indeed protected speech under the First Amendmentand that subsequently the students disorderly conduct adjudication could not
standthe court noted the distinction between a threat and a true threat.266 A
threat, the court reasoned, is a nebulous concept describing anything from an
expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil, or punishment to a generalized menacing,267 while a true threat, as the court defined it, is a constitutional
term of art used to describe a specific category of unprotected speech and subject
to a complete ban by the statethus true threats were subject to proscription under
the disorderly conduct statute.268
In determining whether expression is a true threat, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
like the court in Demers, employed a reasonable speaker analysis.269 In applying the
261

The Wisconsin law specified that [w]hoever, in a public or private place, engages in
violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly
conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance
is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Id. at 732.
262
See id. at 735 ([T]he First Amendment does not inherently bar the State from applying
[the disorderly conduct statute] to unprotected speech, even if the unprotected speech is
purely written speech.).
263
See id. at 73738 (However, we cannot agree with Douglass contention that
threatening a public school teacher while in school is not the type of conduct that tends to
cause or provoke a disturbance. . . . [T]he public has become increasingly concerned with
serious student threats of violence. With this in mind, we cannot imagine how a student
threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that tends to menace, disrupt, or destroy
public order. (citations omitted)).
264
See id. at 738 (Simply because a listener exhibits fortitude in the face of a threat is no
reason to allow the threat to go unpunished. Accordingly, we conclude that the fact that
Douglass story did not cause an actual disturbance is irrelevant to the present inquiry. It is
enough that Douglas conveyed his story to Mrs. C under circumstances where such conduct
tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.).
265
Id. at 73839.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 739 (quoting T HE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1868 (3d ed. 1992)).
268
Id. at 739 (citing State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 2011)).
269
See id. at 73940 (describing the test as whether a speaker would reasonably foresee that
a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as
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reasonable speaker test, the court found that the juvenile defendant could have expected another student to end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event
just as the class assignment had called for, meaning that his story was indeed not a
true threat despite his teacher feeling threatened and his direct communication of the
story to her.270 The court cited several factors in determining that the story was not a
serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm,271 including that it was written in
the third person, it contained hyperbole and attempts at jest, and that the student was
merely completing a class assignment within its given parameters. 272 The fact that
the story was written for class was important to the courts analysis as it argued that
[h]ad [the student] penned the same story in a math class, for example, where such
a tale likely would be grossly outside the scope of his assigned work, we would have
a different case before us.273
While the Wisconsin Supreme Courts analysis using the true threat doctrine is
far superior to the application as seen in the Demers opinion, it still leaves something to be desired as it fails to truly consider whether the student speaker should
have reasonably foreseen whether others would take the short story as a true threat.
The court did mention that the student could have expected another student to end his
grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined eventthus attempting to analyze what
the student should have understood at the time he wrote his storybut all other relevant facts cited by the court in its analysis speak to how a reader would understand
the story.274 While an argument could be made that the writer was a careful student
of English and clearly understood how a change in narrative perspective could affect
the threatening tone of a violent short story, this seems unlikely at best.275 Similarly,
distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other
similarly protected speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out
the threat (footnote omitted)).
270
Id. at 741.
271
Id. at 739 (defining true threat for purposes of the reasonable speaker test).
272
Id. at 741.
273
Id.
274
See id. at 741. As the court argued:
[I]n the context of a creative writing class, [the students] story does not
amount to a true threat. First, the story does not contain any language
directly addressed from [the student] to Mrs. C. Rather, it is written in the
third person, with no mention of [the student]. Second, [the students]
story contains hyperbole and attempts at jest. It jokes that the C in
Mrs. C is short for crab. In addition, it suggests that Mrs. C is so mean
that she beats children and speculates that, for this reason, she became
a teacher. Third, Mrs. C explained to [the student] that in this particular
assignment, he merely was to begin writing a story that other children
would complete. Thus, [the student] could have expected another student
to end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event.
Id.
275
See id. But see id. at 756 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (noting that in third-person fiction, the
writer is not an actor; the writer stands apart manipulating the characters such as Dick and
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the court does not clarify how the student should have understood what it meant to
include his attempts at jest.276
Admittedly, the courts true threat test does cite both a speaker [who] would reasonably foresee and a listener [who] would reasonably interpret, but by the courts
own definition, the analysis begins with what the speaker knows and understands.277
Therefore, more attention should have been given to precisely what a reasonable
student would have understood in the writers situation.278
Despite finding for the student, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful to
frame its decision as providing protection only against criminal charges, as the court
maintained the school took appropriate disciplinary action against the student279
and that [b]y no means should schools interpret this holding as undermining their
authority to utilize their internal disciplinaryprocedures to punish speech.280 In coming
to the conclusion that the decision to impose an in-school suspension281 against the student was justified, the court engaged in a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court
cases, noting Tinkers admonishment that educators may not punish students merely
for expressing unpopular viewpoints282 and contrasting that with the language from
Fraser suggesting that schools must inculcate in our children the habits and manners
Mrs. C. to do his bidding and thus the student was capable of conveying a threat through
the words and actions of his characters).
276
See id. at 741.
277
See id. at 739.
278
The dissent, somewhat mockingly, actually phrases this line of analysis well:
[L]ooking backward, the question the circuit court faced was whether a
speaker or writer in Douglass position (a 13-year-old boy, already an adjudicated delinquent, who had clashed with his teacher about discipline
matters in the past and who was angry because his teacher had sent him
out into the hall during an English class) would reasonably foresee that
a listener or reader in the teachers position (a new teacher, beginning
her first full year of teaching in a public school, in a national environment of apprehension about school violence, who is handed a crude piece
of fiction that insults teachers, names and criticizes her thinly-veiled [sic]
fictional equivalent, draws a parallel to a disciplinary incident in which
the teacher was involved moments before, and then implies that the student will cut off her head with a machete because he is angry at her discipline) would reasonably interpret the writing as a serious expression
of a purpose to inflict harm (actual injury, intimidation, or fear of injury,
thereby disrupting her emotional tranquility and her ability to teach in the
classroom), as opposed to hyperbole and exaggeration or jest that would
make a person smile at the students imagination and cleverness.
Id. at 755 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
279
Id. at 741.
280
Id. at 742.
281
See id. at 731. The length of suspension, however, was unclear.
282
Id. at 742 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
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of civility.283 The court then implied that Fraser was particularly applicable as it
found that the school had more than enough reason to discipline [the student] for the
content of his story as it represented an offensive, crass insult to the teacher.284 Thus,
as the court concluded, [s]chools need not tolerate this type of assault to the sensibilities of their educators or students.285
There are at least three relevant observations to make regarding the courts discussion of the use of school discipline in In re Douglas D. First, there is no suggestion that the courts conclusion as to the constitutionality of school discipline is
anything other than dicta as the student was not appealing his suspension.286 Second,
while the precise analysis is unclear, the courts decision to focus on the offensive,
crass nature of the story rather than its pedagogical implications suggests the court
would find Fraser to be controlling where possibly threatening and graphically violent student speech is concerned. 287 The court does not specify why Fraser, with its
focus on sexually explicit speech, is applicable and Hazelwood is not, but the lack of
any discussion of the latter is somewhat telling as a broader failure to consider the
educational implications of violent non-sponsored curricular speech.
Finally, the discussion of school discipline is notable for the courts declaration
that schools may discipline conduct even where law enforcement officials may not.288
That conclusion may be an obvious one considering that the court found that the story
was both protected by the First Amendmentin that it was not a true threat289and
subject to school discipline, a somewhat contradictory position noted by a dissenting
283

Id. at 742 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
Id. at 743.
285
Id.
286
While it is unclear why the court decided to address whether the suspension was constitutional, the court was likely sensitive to various public perceptions of its decision. See id.
at 742 n.16 (We recognize that public opinion regarding protected freedoms may wax and
wane over time. However, courts should not easily be swayed by public opinion, particularly
in matters of constitutional rights. . . . Ever conscious of the principles undergirding the Constitution, this court must not succumb to public pressure when deciding the law. Headlines
may be appropriate support for policy arguments on the floor of the legislature, but they cannot
support an abandonment in our courthouses of the constitutional principles that the judiciary
is charged to uphold.). By both reversing the students juvenile adjudication and finding his
suspension constitutional, the court in essence could have it both ways: upholding what it found
to be its constitutional obligations in the face of a potentially unpopular decision and giving
critics of the result some measure of a victory.
287
See id. at 743 ([W]e also recognize that it is a highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.) (quoting
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). But see id. at 748 (Crooks, J., concurring) (suggesting that [a] school
can, and should, discipline a student for speech and conduct that is inappropriate and disruptive, and in no way adds to the schools educational mission, and thus tacitly implying that
Tinker would control the analysis of whether the discipline was constitutional).
288
Id. at 743.
289
Id. at 741.
284
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justice.290 The specifics of the students school discipline are unclear from the courts
opinion,291 but at some point, the punitive authority of the school approaches that of
the criminal justice system regarding what exactly a school can do to a student and what
impact adverse disciplinary decisions might have.292 Therefore, the seriousness of
school discipline in all situations should be at least considered before summarily dismissing its consequences by implication.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Courts majority opinion attempted to balance concerns regarding school violence and the rights guaranteed under the Constitution,
one dissenting justice struck a decidedly reactionary tone as he began his opinion by
listing school shooting deaths from 1993 to 1999.293 The dissent found the student
to be a troubled young man294 and would have upheld his juvenile adjudication,
arguing that his colleagues misapplied the true threat doctrine295 and inappropriately
cherry-picked through the facts to find that the story was protected speech. 296
In addition to calling for deference to school administrators,297 the dissent also
argued for placing threatening and violent student speech outside of the boundaries
of the First Amendment as incendiary per se, much like shouting fire in a crowded
290

See id. at 75960 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (The majority opinion asserts that some speech
in public schools is protected from criminal prosecution but may be suppressed by rules and
punished through internal school discipline. When? Are school officials expected to know the
answer by instinct? The majoritys untested thesis deserves authority and additional discussion.); see also id. at 75859 (The proposition that speech uttered in the exact same
contextsame speaker, same words, same time, same placeis fully protected by the First
Amendment against some state action but not against other state action, is less established. To
give speech a dual character (protected/unprotected) depending upon who is seeking to punish
it or how severe the punishment may be, will eliminate certainty in the law and create a chilling
effect upon both speech and discipline.).
291
The majority opinion cites only an in-school suspension of an indeterminate length.
Id. at 731. While this is certainly nothing to scoff at, it clearly does not rise to the level of an
expulsion as seen in other violent student expression cases.
292
In this case, the student was adjudicated delinquent and ordered to be placed under
formal supervision for a year. Id. This contrasts with his in-school suspension. Id. If the school
had formally expelled the student or suspended him for an extended period, this school discipline might have rivaled the juvenile courts punishment in terms of adverse effects.
293
See id. at 74950 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
294
Id. at 751 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
295
Id. at 754 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (The majoritys analysis is confusing. As a result,
it is not clear what impact the courts decision will have on safety and discipline in Wisconsin schools.).
296
See id. at 755 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (It is quite wrong for this court to sift through the
factual circumstances, minimizing the factors that are present and emphasizing factors that are
not there.).
297
Id. at 758 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (Macabre writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life.
Then again, they may be a true threat. The facts are best determined by fact-finders on the scene,
not appellate judges.).
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theatre or making a joke about terrorism at an airport.298 The dissenting justice tied
his belief in this categorical exemption to First Amendment protection to the popular
conception of widespread school violence as he argued that [t]oday our country is
consumed by the outbreak of violence in public schools and that therefore [t]hreats
of violence in schools must be taken seriously.299 As the dissent contended, the
nature of the contemporary school environment coupled with, as the justice saw it,
the relatively low value of violent student speech300 meant that schools should have
carte blanche authority to punish and otherwise censor such student expression. 301
However, this belief that violent student speech should be categorically exempt from
First Amendment protection goes against current Supreme Court trends to limit expression automatically excluded from constitutional protection.302
In addition to using state law and the true threat doctrine, at least one court has
addressed a somewhat novel approach in the context of student expression and
violent non-sponsored curricular speech. In Cox v. Warwick Valley Central School
District,303 the Second Circuit decided a case in which a middle school student wrote
a story for class that detailed what he would do if he only had twenty-four hours to
live.304 The story the student eventually turned in imagined his escapades in getting
drunk, smoking, doing drugs, and breaking the law and concluded with the student
taking cyanide and shooting himself in the head in front of his friends at the end of the
24 hours.305 After the story was handed in, the students teacher gave it to the
schools principal who immediately took the student out of class to discuss the contents of the story.306 The student, after assuring the principal the story was merely fiction
and that he had no intentions to harm himself or others, was then given an in-school
298

Id. at 76162 (Prosser, J., dissenting). The dissent similarly noted that [i]ntentional bomb
scares also fall outside protected speech. Id.
299
Id. at 761 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also id. (Almost inevitably these threats produce
fear among students and teachers. They inflict harm and impair the atmosphere for learning.).
300
See id. (Prosser, J., dissenting) (Threats of violence against students, teachers, or administrators in schools are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. They materially disrupt classwork, and therefore
are not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
301
See id. at 76772 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (arguing that threats against students, teachers,
and administrators in a school setting should not be afforded First Amendment protection).
302
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 46872 (2010) (noting that depictions
of animal cruelty might be protected by the First Amendment); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
1207, 122021 (2011) (finding that the First Amendment shielded Westboro Baptist Church
funeral protestors from civil liability).
303
654 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2011).
304
Id. at 270.
305
Id.
306
Id.
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suspension as the principal evaluated the situation.307 Concluding that there was no
immediate threat to the school, the principal sent the student home, and no further
discipline was imposed.308
School officials, however, decided to report the students parents to New York
Child and Family Services, alleging that the students parents were neglectful due
to their lack of concern over both the story and their sons other assorted behavioral
issues.309 The state agency, in turn, suggested that the student receive a psychiatric
evaluation or the parents might otherwise lose custody of their son.310 The parents
complied with the agencys request, but they decided to homeschool their son for the
rest of the year after the agencys investigation concluded the original report by the
principal was unfounded.311 The parents then sued the principal and the school district, claiming the students First Amendment rights were violated specifically by
the principal acting in retaliation for the students story.312
In reviewing the district courts summary judgment decision for the principal and
the school district, the Second Circuit stated that to prove a First Amendment retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First
Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was
a causal connection between this adverse action and the protected speech.313 Naturally, the students parents argued his story was protected by the First Amendment.314
The adverse action connected to that speech, they argued, was the decision to both
place the student in in-school suspension and make the report to Child and Family
307

Id. at 27071.
Id. at 271.
309
Id. The principals phone call to Child and Family Services was summarized and included
in the courts opinion:
13 yr old [student] has been repeatedly writing in his journal violent homicidal and suicidal imagery while in school. He has also participated in
acts of vandalism and brought dangerous objects into school such as fireworks and pieces of metal. [Student] recently expressed suicidal thoughts
and had a very descriptive plan for doing it in that he would take his
favorite weapon, a ruger place it in his mouth with a cyanide pill and
shoot himself and everyone would party for a week. The school recommended to the parents that they seek a psychiatric evaluation for their
son but they have refused to do so. The parents are minimizing the
childs thoughts and behaviors and state that this is just fiction and all
a misunderstanding. It is believed the child is a danger to himself and
other[s] at this point. The parents are failing to provide a minimal degree
of care to their son.
Id. (last alteration in original).
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Id. at 272.
314
Id.
308
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Services.315 These arguments were unsuccessful, however, as the Second Circuit upheld the district courts grant of summary judgment.316
In coming to its conclusion, the court sidestepped the issue of whether the students story was protected by the First Amendment to find simply that none of the
principals actions constituted retaliation.317 While admitting there was no clear
definition of adverse action in the school context,318 the court applied an objective
standard focused on determining whether a defendants actions would deter others from
exercising constitutionally protected rights.319 The court also noted that this test for
an adverse action was a highly context-specific examination and was therefore to
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.320 In
applying an adverse action standard, the court noted the difficult position of teachers
and administrators as they have multiple responsibilities: teaching, maintaining
order, and protecting troubled and neglected students.321 Furthermore, [i]n their
various roles, school administrators must distinguish empty boasts from serious threats,
rough-housing from bullying, and an active imagination from a dangerous impulse.322
To sort through those possible threats, the court contended that school administrators must be allowed to conduct an investigation, even when that inquiry results in
a student who is separated, interviewed, or temporarily sequestered to defuse a potentially volatile or dangerous situation.323 Thus, as the court determined, the temporary removal of a student from regular school activities in response to speech
exhibiting violent, disruptive, lewd, or otherwise harmful ideations is not an adverse
action for purposes of the First Amendment absent a clear showing of intent to chill
speech or punish it.324 Without this ability to temporarily remove a student to assess
a situation, the court argued simply that [a] school cannot function.325
315

Id.
Id.
317
Id. at 273.
318
Id. (noting also that First Amendment student speech cases ordinarily involve explicit
censorship or avowedly disciplinary action by school administrators and retaliation was
therefore a somewhat unusual issue in the student speech setting).
319
See id. (defining an adverse action as conduct that would deter a similarly situated
individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights (quoting
Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)).
320
Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
321
Id. (also noting the mandatory reporting requirement imposed on teachers and other
school officials).
322
Id. at 274.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
See id. (Although a student and his parents might perceive such removal as disciplinary
or retaliatory, its objective purpose is protective. It affords the administrators time to make
an inquiry, to figure out if there is danger, and to determine the proper response: discipline, a
benign intervention, or something else. A school cannot function without affording teachers
and administrators fair latitude to make these inquiries.).
316
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With those principles established, the court concluded that there was no adverse
action, as the principals decision to remove the student to in-school suspension was
only a precautionary measure to ensure that ambiguous student expression did not
portend disruption or violence.326 Similarly, the principals decision to call Child
and Family Services was a protectivenot disciplinaryact and could not serve as
the basis for a retaliation claim.327 Therefore, in Cox, the Second Circuit made it clear
that investigatory efforts in violent non-sponsored curricular speech were due unusual
deference and could not be considered adverse action without a clear showing of
retaliatory or punitive intent.328
Collectively, these casesDemers, In re Ryan D., In re Douglas D., and Cox
stand for the proposition that student speech jurisprudence is not the exclusive means
of analysis in cases concerning violent non-sponsored curricular student speech. While
the true threat doctrine appears to be a focus in juvenile adjudications, Demers
demonstrates that it can be used in school discipline cases as well, even as the judge
in the case declined to state whether student speech jurisprudence or the true threat
doctrine was appropriate for the case.329 In re Ryan D. and In re Douglas D. additionally show the states difficult burden in building a true threat argument where
a student willingly turns in an assignment as a part of regular coursework. Finally,
Cox is important as it distinguishes between appropriate measures designed to enable
school safety and those actions intended to punish speech, as the Second Circuit gave
schools a wide latitude for the former and suggested a prohibition on the latter.
These cases employed a distinctly different form of analysis as compared to the
previously discussed court decisions using the Tinker standard.330 Yet the Tinker
cases and the true threat and other doctrine cases used a legal framework that was
clearly established and explained in the text of the various court opinions. This clarity,
however, is not a constant in the area of violent non-sponsored curricular speech as
Part II.B.3 will show.
3. Cases Using Unclear or Incomplete Means of Analysis
Although most cases involving violent non-sponsored curricular student speech
are clear in their legal analysis, two cases decided in the federal district courtsEmmett
326

Id.
Id.
328
Id.
329
Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 20203 (D.
Mass. 2003) (describing both the true threat doctrine and the Tinker standard before generically
concluding that, on the facts of the case, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a
school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption); see also supra note 208 (questioning the appropriateness of the Demers courts refusal to decide which case law was suited
to the case).
330
See supra Part II.B.1.
327
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v. Kent School District No. 415331 and D.F. v. Board of Education of Syosset Central
School District332employed a legal framework that was less explicit as compared
to previously discussed cases. However, Emmett and D.F. demonstrate that while
the facts are often similar in violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases, the legal
analysis employed can be vastly different and unfortunately unclear or incomplete.
In Emmett, a federal district court in Washington State was tasked with deciding
the fate of a student who had been disciplined by his school after creating a website that
featured mock obituaries of his friends and asked website visitors to vote on the subject
of the next obituary.333 The website, though, was inspired by a creative writing assignment for class in which students were to write similarly fictional obituaries.334 After
the website was sensationalized on local television news as a hit list, the student was
given an emergency expulsion that was later modified to a five-day suspension.335
The district court, however, enjoined the school from enforcing the suspension as
the student won on a motion for a preliminary injunction.336
In evaluating the students likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial, the
district court noted first that [t]he First Amendment provides some, but not complete, protection for students in a school setting.337 The court then discussed the
relevant student speech jurisprudence, beginning with Tinker before moving on to
Fraser and Hazelwood.338 Especially relevant to Emmett, the court noted that in Fraser,
Justice William Brennan suggested in a concurring opinion that the student could
not have been punished for his sexually explicit speech had it been given off-campus
instead of delivered in a school assembly.339 Applying the Supreme Courts student
speech precedents, the district court found that the students website was not at a
school assembly, as in Fraser, and was not in a school-sponsored newspaper, as in
[Hazelwood].340 Yet despite these references to Fraser and Hazelwood, a serious
discussion of Tinker and its application in Emmett was nowhere to be found in the
courts opinion.341
331

92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
386 F. Supp. 2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
333
Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
334
Id.; see also infra notes 34044 and accompanying text (explaining why the website
in Emmett should be considered non-sponsored curricular speech).
335
Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
336
Id. at 1090.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
340
Id.
341
The court mentioned Tinker only to state the general holding (that students do not abandon their right to expression at the schoolhouse gates, but that prohibition of expressive conduct
is justifiable if the conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
332
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Rather than applying Tinker, the court appeared to focus on its notion that the
website was not produced in connection with any class or school project342thereby
failing to recognize the websites origins in a class assignment. The court observed
that while the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to the school, the website was entirely outside of the schools supervision or control,343 and, as the court
concluded, it represented out-of-school speech not subject to school discipline.344
In addition to finding the website was out-of-school speech, the court also
noted, without further discussion, the schools lack of evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this website were intended to threaten anyone, did actually
threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.345 Without any
evidence as to the threatening nature of the website, the court determined that the
students suspension could not be sustained based on the violent content of the website despite the acutely difficult position of administrators following incidents of
school violence.346 The absence of evidence as to any true threat represented by the
website, when combined with the . . . out-of-school nature of the speech, gave the
student a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his case at trial,
thereby resulting in the courts decision to grant an injunction in his favor.347
While the courts eventual determination in Emmett is easy enough to understand,
the decision still lacks a complete discussion of the true threat doctrine in addition
to the absence of an explanation as to why Tinker does not apply. Limiting the application of Tinker is necessaryespecially where online speech is concernedbut the
opinion should have explained exactly why Tinker did not apply despite the audiences connection to the school. The Emmett courts outcome was ultimately preferable,
but given the tie to the students education, the reasoning should have been different.348
If nothing else, the court could have done more to establish a clear procedure for determining when Tinker does and does not apply in instances of online student speech.
Where Emmett was merely incomplete, the analysis by the federal district court in
D.F. was unfortunately unclear. In that case, a twelve-year-old sixth-grade student
wrote for a class journal a story fashioned in the style of a horror movie.349 The story
featured a protagonist who stabbed bad kids, decapitated others, and observed characters kissing and having sex.350 The student first read his story without permission
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school) and to note that Fraser and Hazelwood
defined the limits of Tinker. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
See infra Part IV for discussion of a proposed standard for non-sponsored curricular
speech.
349
D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
350
Id. (also noting that [s]ome of the characters were named after actual students).
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to others in his class, but when he asked his teacher for permission to read aloud to his
classmates, the teacher wanted to read the story first.351 Upon reading the story, the
teacher brought it to the attention of the principal, who decided to suspend the student
for five days.352 After a disciplinary hearing in which the presiding officer determined
the story was designed to place individuals in fear of bodily harm, the suspension
was increased to thirty days.353 The student, however, appealed the schools decision
in federal court, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.354
In granting the schools motion to dismiss the case and therefore uphold the
thirty-day suspension, the court explained first that [f]reedom of speech . . . is not
an unfettered right for any U.S. citizen.355 The court then noted that true threatsthat
speech serving as a serious expression of an intent to cause present or future harm
as the court defined itmay be properly prohibited.356 Additionally, the court observed that student speech rights are limited, consistent with Tinker, where such
expression materially or substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or would substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.357 The court
also summarized the holdings of Fraser and Hazelwood as allowing administrators
to censor student speech that is inconsistent with [the school]s basic educational
mission, vulgar, or school-sponsored.358
Applying these relevant principles, the court concluded that the students story
was unprotected speech because the plaintiff, as a minor and a student, [was] not
entitled to unbridled First Amendment protection in the school setting.359 Exclusively applying student speech jurisprudence, the court found that:
[t]he story, with its graphic depictions of the murder of specifically named students and sex between named students, may
materially interfere with the work of the school by disturbing the
students and teachers. For example, at one point in the story, the
murderer kicks a girl named Shanna in the mouth and Shanna
responds by kissing the murderer while blood is pouring out of
her mouth.360
351

Id.
Id.
353
Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).
354
Id.
355
Id. at 125.
356
Id. (quoting Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)).
357
Id. (quoting Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993 (E.D. Mich.
2003)).
358
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
359
Id.
360
Id. at 12526.
352
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Here the courts analysis is unclear. By referencing a possible disturbance in the
school, the court implicates Tinker, but by focusing on the graphic and sexual nature
of the story, the courts discussion implies a Fraser-based reasoning. This distinction is important as school discipline need not be premised on an actual or potential
disruption under Fraser, whereas Tinker requires something more than undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.361 Therefore, the courts decision very
well could have been premised upon Tinker (assuming there was relevant evidence
of a disruption or a reasonable fear thereof) or Fraser (if the sexual content of the
story was objectionable enough), but logically, it cannot be based on both decisions.
While the student speech analysis was unclear at best, the courts use of the true
threat doctrine was remarkably incomplete. In analyzing the story under the true
threat framework, the court determined that the story constitutes a true threat of violence as it describes a student killing other real-life students.362 The court went on
to frame the problem with the story in light of school violence, writing that the court
was well aware of the legacy of fear and panic that recent acts of devastating school
violence have wrought in this country and that [s]chools must be able to protect
their student bodies against such acts and be able to provide a modicum of security
for their parents and students.363
Any discussion of the specifics of the true threat doctrine was startlingly absent
as the court simply concluded, much as the Demers court did,364 that the story was a
true threat without undertaking any real analysis or offering any explanation of its
reasoning aside from the general observations regarding school violence. Compounding
this problem was the fact that the court was particularly unskilled in its word choice
as it stated that the story describes a violent incident.365 A true threat, by its very
definition, must amount to more than a simple description of violence, or otherwise
many fiction writers would be subject to criminal prosecution.366 Tying a description
of violence to the legacy of fear and panic generated by acts of school violence
does not meet the legal threshold necessary to exclude the students story from First
Amendment protections. Thus, the D.F. court failed to adequately address whether
the students story was indeed a true threat.
361

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (emphasis added).
363
Id.
364
See supra notes 20811 and accompanying text.
365
D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
366
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 35960 (2003) (True threats encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to
protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs
a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
362
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Yet this failure is merely symptomatic of a larger concern in many of the cases
that address violent non-sponsored curricular student speech in that the analysis is
simply incorrect. Some courts that apply Tinker incorrectly consider the potential harm
resulting from a school shooting (instead of the specific disruption caused by violent
student speech),367 while other courts using Tinker engage in elaborate speculation
to uphold school discipline.368 Analysis under the true threat doctrine is similarly poor,
as courts either fail to truly consider the objective perspective of a student speaker,369
or simply find that violent student speech represents a true threat without any support for that conclusion.370 However, the most notable omission from the legal analysis
in most of these cases is a consideration of the educational issues implicated when
a school or the state punishes a student speaking in furtherance of education.
Therefore, a critical analysis of these cases reveals that courts apply vastly different
standards even when the factsin that they are examples of violent student speech integrally related to educationare remarkably similar. Furthermore, these cases have
not been identified by courts as a discrete class of cases deserving of a specialized
analysis; rather, these cases are firmly planted in the post-Columbine, postVirginia
Tech, post-Newtown mindset of heightened deference to school administrators and
an understandable preoccupation with school safety.
This Part of the Article has focused on describing how these cases are decided,
including some examination of the perceived shortcomings of current legal analysis.
Looking at how these examples of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech
have been analyzed under current case law, it is clear that neither Tinker nor the true
threat doctrine are adequate solutions to the unique issues involved with this type
of expression not sponsored by schools but still integral to education. In an effort to
remedy this doctrinal problem, Part III begins this Articles examination of the normative ideal in trying to answer how these cases should be decided.
III. ELIMINATING CURRENT CASE LAW OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
VIOLENT NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR SPEECH
As Part II detailed, this Article seeks to define and clarify the proper regulation
of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech, a subset of student speech that
has yet to be substantively identified and addressed by the Supreme Court. Part III
will specifically explain why current case law as applied fails to address this area of
student speech, identifying, in turn, deficiencies with the true threat doctrine, Morse
367

See, e.g., supra notes 18689 and accompanying text (discussing LaVine v. Blaine
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001), and Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp.
2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003)).
368
See supra notes 2126, 20007 and accompanying text (discussing Cuff ex rel. B.C.
v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012)).
369
See supra notes 26978 and accompanying text (discussing In re Douglas D., 626
N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001)).
370
See supra notes 22935 and accompanying text (discussing Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195).
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and Fraser, Tinker, and Hazelwood. By eliminating all of these possible doctrinal solutions, only then is it clear that a new standard for non-sponsored curricular student
speech is necessary.
A. Why the True Threat Doctrine Is Not an Appropriate Approach
As demonstrated with In re Douglas D., Demers, D.F., and In re Ryan D., the true
threat doctrine has been used by courts to analyze cases of violent non-sponsored
curricular student speech. However, each of the decisions demonstrated either a difficulty in proving the presence of a true threat where a student is turning in a class
assignment, as in In re Ryan D. and In re Douglas D., or simply poor analysis on the
part of the court, such as the Demers court deciding without further explanation that
the student should have concluded that his drawing and note would be considered
a threat to the school371 and the D.F. court concluding the story in that case was a
true threat only because it describes a student killing other real-life students.372
The distinction between the four cases is seen not only in the outcomewith In re
Ryan D.373 and In re Douglas D.374 overturning juvenile adjudications, and Demers375
and D.F.376 upholding school disciplinebut also in the seriousness and thoroughness of the true threat analysis. When courts seriously consider the issues involved
in applying the true threat doctrine in the area of non-sponsored curricular student
speech, the natural outcome should be to find for the student and establish the absence
of a true threat.
A common sense examination of threats, creativity, and education led the In re
Ryan D. and In re Douglas D. courts to their respective determinations regarding the
absence of a true threat. As the California Court of Appeal noted in In re Ryan D., a
criminal threat . . . is a specific and narrow class of communication and [o]rdinarily,
a person wishing to threaten another would not do so by communicating with
someone in a position of authority over the person making the threat.377 Therefore,
for a student to turn in a painting both for a grade and with the intention of threatening
someone else in the school communityas the state alleged in In re Ryan D.it
would be a rather unconventional and odd means of communicating a threat.378
Rather than relying on the nature of threats, the Wisconsin Supreme Court based
its decision in In re Douglas D. more on the specific elements of the story and the
371

Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. Mass.
2003).
372
D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
373
In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
374
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 742 (Wis. 2001).
375
Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
376
D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
377
In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200.
378
Id.
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class assignment.379 In coming to its decision, the court noted that the story was written
in the third person, contained hyperbole and attempts at jest, and attempted to conform to the parameters of the teachers assignment.380 More generally, however, the
story was written in the context of a creative writing classa class in which, as the
court observed, teachers and students alike should expect and allow more creative licensebe it for better or, as in this case, for worsethan in other circumstances.381
In fully applying the true threat doctrine, the California Court of Appeal and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court essentially came to the same conclusion: Logically, it
makes little sense to find a true threat where a student turns in a creative work that
is a part of the school curriculumeither because that does not satisfy the typical
norms of a true threat or because creativity demands some leeway when it comes to
student expression.
However, that is not to assert that a student assignment can never be a true
threat. As Florida State University neared a berth in the 2013 national college football championship game with star quarterback Jameis Winston implicated in a
sexual assault, sports website Deadspin published an essay from an FSU English
instructor that examined the relationship between academics and major college
athletics.382 For the purposes of a discussion on violent non-sponsored curricular
speech, the essay contained a cogent example of what could be a true threat in the
context of a class assignment:
Before Jameis, there was the gay-basher. His teacher, Robert,
was also one of Florida States superstars, a professor in training
with a pile of prestigious awards and grants. He is also gay, a fact
that any of my students are gonna figure out pretty quickly, he
says. The defensive back took his required writing class a few
summers back, and they met early in the course for a one-on-one
conference to discuss an assigned essay exploring a significant
personal moment in the students lives.
It was just me and him in my windowless office on the fourth
floor of an empty campus building, Robert says. The player submitted his essay and went down the hall for a drink, while Robert
read it and promptly freaked out.
The paper was a very graphic, very detailed, very proud telling of how he basically got his high school classmates together to
379

In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741.
Id.
381
Id.
382
Adam Weinstein, Jameis Winston Isnt the Only Problem Here: An FSU Teachers
Lament, DEADSPIN (Nov. 21, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://deadspin.com/jameis-winston-isnt-the
-only-problem-here-an-fsu-teac-1467707410.
380

836

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:785

beat the shit out of this faga word used often in the work
and literally kick him in the teeth to teach him a lesson. They
were sick of their mark acting like a girl, Robert recalls, and so
they went about punching him in the face, emptying his gumline.
The tone of the players essay was that he was very proud of
himself. He had taken the initiative to organize this beating.
Robert panicked. The essays victim talked sexually, had
tight clothes, and had feminine featuressome of which could
be [sic] certainly be said of me, he says. Why would he give
that to me? I took it in the moment as a personal threat.
When the player returned, Robert faked getting an important
text and begged out of the conference, then ran down to a mentors
office to report the paper. The situation was handled well, he said:
He never had to see that student again. Still, he had no clue as to
the players motivesor his rehabilitation.383
This example shares some definite commonalities with In re Douglas D., the Wisconsin case regarding a student who wrote a short story about a student who came to
class & in his coat he conseled [sic] a machedy [sic] and cut off his teachers head.384
Both the FSU assignment and the assignment in In re Douglas D. were completed as
part of a class assignment, and they were given directly to the person they purportedlythreatened. Both stories also employed identifiable characteristics of the individual
arguably targeted, with the story in In re Douglas D. referencing a teacher by the name
of Mrs. C385 and the FSU essay describing the beating of a homosexual.386
A key difference, however, is the specific context: the story in In re Douglas D.
was a work of fiction387 as compared to the personal essay describing a purportedly
real event in the FSU example.388 In addition to being fiction, the story in In re
Douglas D. was less believable as a threat because it contained elements of hyperbole and humor.389 The essay detailed in the Deadspin post is different because it
purportedly described something that happened, so it can necessarily transmit an
implied message of this might happen to you as well. While such a threat may have
been present in In re Douglas D.,390 in the FSU story it is stark, real, and much closer
383

Id.
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 731.
385
Id. at 73031 (noting that the students English teacher commonly referred to herself as
Mrs. C. in class).
386
Weinstein, supra note 382.
387
See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 730 (establishing the rules of the assignment).
388
Weinstein, supra note 382.
389
See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 73031 (quoting the students story); see also id.
at 741 (explaining the courts reasoning in determining the story was not a true threat).
390
The state argued that the students threat to Mrs. C [was] direct and clear: If she discipline[d] him again, he intend[ed] to injure her. Id. at 740. Additionally, the Wisconsin
384
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to a legal consideration of what a threat should be: [a] communicated intent to inflict
harm or loss on another or on anothers property, especially one that might diminish
a persons freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent.391 Still, without knowing
more about the specific situation that was described at FSU or the students intentions in writing the story, it is hard to label the students essay a true threat. It does,
however, come a great deal closer to the legal, objective standard of what a true threat
should be than any of the stories or artistic creations described in In re Douglas D.,
Demers, D.F., and In re Ryan D.
The true threat doctrine is simply a poor methodological fit for the area of violent
non-sponsored curricular speech. As the California Court of Appeal noted, the notion
of a student turning in an assignment both to threaten and to gain normal academic
credit is hard to reconcile with traditional ideas of threatening and menacing communication.392 Furthermore, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded, curricular
speech requires more creative license, and a boys impetuous writings do not necessarily fall from First Amendment protection due to their offensive nature.393 These
determinations serve as a sharp contrast to the D.F. courts decision that a students
story represented a true threat simply because it described violence against other
students.394 Additionally, while courts applying the true threat doctrine in juvenile
adjudications may appear to be dissimilar from courts applying the true threat doctrine in examining school discipline, for the purposes of true threat analysis they are the
same because the legal context should be irrelevant when considering whether communication is a true threat. In other words, the determination of a true threat for school
discipline is the same as the determination of a true threat for criminal punishment. 395
The true threat doctrine, therefore, is usually inappropriate where violent nonsponsored curricular speech is concerned. The application of this testin which a positive result renders speech unprotected both inside and outside of school grounds
should properly be limited to instances where either an intent to threaten is obvious
on the face of the creative work or the communication more closely resembles a traditional threat.
Supreme Court concluded: We do not doubt that the story was a result of [the students]
anger at having been removed from class. Id. at 741. The court, however, did not address
the conditional nature of the alleged threat.
391
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1703 (10th ed. 2014).
392
See In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (This would be
a rather unconventional and odd means of communicating a threat.).
393
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741.
394
D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
395
To phrase the point yet another way, expression cannot be both a true threat for the
purposes of school discipline and not a true threat for criminal prosecution. See In re
Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 743 (suggesting, in a case where a students story was not a true
threat for the purposes of a juvenile adjudication, that school discipline was justified by the
offensive, crass insult posed by the students story, and hinting at Fraser analysis).
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B. Why Morse and Fraser Should Not Apply
In evaluating whether Morse and Fraser, two decisions arguably more narrow
than Tinker and Hazelwood, should apply in instances of violent non-sponsored curricular speech, the major issues to be resolved are whether the permissible prohibition of sexually explicit speech on school grounds in Fraser extends to violent
speech in the classroom and whether Morse articulates a new standard of constitutional censorship premised on school safety. To be consistent with the principles of
the First Amendment, however, the answer to both of these questions must be nothe
doctrinal solution to violent non-sponsored curricular speech cannot come from either
Fraser or Morse.
In addressing how Fraser and Morse could be applicable where violent speech
is concerned, it is important to first note thatdespite the twenty years separating the
decisionsFraser and Morse are operationally quite similar. Both involve deciphering speech with vague or multiple interpretations and rummaging through message
content for an impermissible meaning, as Professor Clay Calvert phrased it.396 The
two decisions, therefore, embrace a meanings-based approach to censorship and
represent a break from the methodology seen in Tinker, a decision that was premised
on the actual effects of speech.397
Continuing the commonalities, both decisions have also seen lower courts broadly
interpret the principles contained in them. Where the decisions differ, however, is
exactly where the expansive interpretation comes into play as lower courts have
broadened what is offensive for the purposes of Fraser while other decisions have
held that Morse enables school administrators to act where speech poses a harm to
the well-being of students.398
Turning first to the proper application of Fraser, it is important to understand
how the decision mechanically works. As Professor Calvert explained, the Fraser
formula is an examination of [w]hether student message X conveys a disfavored
and inappropriate meaning Y that conflicts with educational mission Z.399 This
inquiry is a two-step process that first requires an inquiry into what the meaning of
396
Clay Calvert, Mixed Messages, Muddled Meanings, Drunk Dicks, and Boobies Bracelets:
Sexually Suggestive Student Speech and the Need to Overrule or Radically Refashion Fraser,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 133 (2012) [hereinafter Calvert, Mixed Messages].
397
See id. (Fraser and Morse embrace a meanings-based methodology that permits
censorship based purely upon the resolution of the meaning of a messageregardless of its
likely or actual disruptive effect among studentsand whether, in turn, that meaning contradicts some aspect of a schools educational mission.).
398
See, e.g., Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 3 (describing the interpretation
of Morse that allows for the censorship of speech that threatens a Columbine-style attack
on a school (quoting Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007)));
Christopher Cavaliere, Note, Category Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech Categories,
40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 882 (2011) (explaining the expansive interpretation of Fraser that
creates a nebulous category of speech subject to censorship).
399
Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 134.

2015]

NEITHER TINKER, HAZELWOOD, FRASER, NOR MORSE

839

a given student message may be and then a determination of whether that meaning
conflicts with some aspect of a schools educational mission.400 If strictly interpreted
and limited to its facts, Fraser would apply only to on-campus, spoken speech before
a captive audience at a school assembly where such speech conveys a sexually vulgar,
lewd, or indecent connotation that allegedly overwhelms any political meaning, while
simultaneously glorifying male sexuality in such a way that could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience.401
Yet, where courts find in Fraser an underlying theme around the issue of wellbeing that goes beyond a mere Victorian sensibility of offensiveness,402 the scope
of Fraser is thus broadened to cover other types of speech that might not be compatible with a schools mission. Under such an interpretation, Fraser permits stifling any
manner and any mode, spoken or printed, of any plainly offensive expression, sexual
or otherwise, that conflicts with societys interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.403 This broader view of the holding from
Fraser enables censorship of almost any disfavored speech, and such speech need
not be sexually explicit to fall under an expanded interpretation, as the Sixth Circuit
found when it determined a ban on religiously offensive Marilyn Manson T-shirts
on school grounds to be constitutional under Fraser.404
For the purposes of analyzing violent non-sponsored curricular student speech,
the question is whether this broad interpretation of Fraser could cover violence as well.
As previously discussed, courts have hinted that Fraser may apply where students
produce violent expression in the classroom, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that a students story depicting his teachers decapitation represented an offensive,
crass insult and that [s]chools need not tolerate this type of assault to the sensibilities of their educators or students.405 Similarly, the D.F. court referenced the graphic
depictions of the murder of specifically named students and the sex between named
students while suggesting a hybrid Tinker-Fraser analysis.406
400

Id.
Id. at 146 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
402
Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a New
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1221, 1233 (2009).
403
Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 147 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
404
Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). School administrators in Boroff found a students T-shirts celebrating rock group Marilyn Manson to be
offensive because the band promotes destructive conduct and demoralizing values that are
contrary to the educational mission of the school. Id. at 469. As per one example cited by
the Sixth Circuit in its discussion and subsequent affirmation that Fraser was controlling,
one shirt included a depiction of a three-headed Jesus alongside the words See No Truth.
Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth. Id. Fraser, therefore, was interpreted by the Sixth Circuit
to cover not only sexually offensive speech but religiously offensive speech as well.
405
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 726, 743 (Wis. 2001).
406
D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 12526 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also supra notes
34966 and accompanying text (explaining why the courts approach was logically inconsistent).
401
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Despite this limited embrace of the reasoning shown in Fraser to address violent
non-sponsored curricular speech, it is important to note two key limitations on extending Frasers application into the realm of violent classroom speech. First, in Morse,
the Supreme Court expressly limited the application of Fraser, as Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote that the earlier decision should not be read to encompass any speech
that could fit under some definition of offensive.407 Second, in considering the
original facts of Fraser, it is worth noting that the speech at issue in the case was determined to be an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor by the Court,408
a metaphor that caused the Fraser majority to fear for those students who were only
on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.409 Therefore, Fraser should
properly be considered as a case regarding only sexually explicit speech and thus
falling in line with other Supreme Court decisions that simply treat sexual speech
differently when compared to other types of speech.410 Together, these two points
suggest that the proper application of Fraser is limited only to sexually explicit
speech and not other speech, such as violent student expression, that might otherwise be offensive in the school setting.
However, even as the Morse Court attempted to limit the application of Fraser,
the opinion in Morse has been subjected to its own expansive interpretation. Despite
the initial assessments that suggested Morse would be limited to speech advocating
drug use and therefore limited to the facts of the case,411 language in both the Courts
407

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007). As the Chief Justice continued: After all,
much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some. The concern here
is not that Fredericks speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use. Id.; see also Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 146 (The Supreme
Courts ruling in Morse began to rein in the potential reach of Fraser, at least as applied to
offensive expression.).
408
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 67778 (1986).
409
Id. at 683.
410
Compare Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675 (finding sexually explicit student speech unprotected
in the school setting), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC indecency regulations under theory of broadcast communication pervasiveness and need to protect
children from age-inappropriate speech), and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
(creating a variable definition of obscenity as to minors and allowing states to further insulate
them from age-inappropriate sexual speech), with Brown v. Entmt Merch. Assn, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011) (finding violent video games to be protected speech under the First Amendment
and that California law banning their sale to minors was not sufficiently tailored to pass strict
scrutiny), and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (finding violent books and magazines to be protected expression).
411
See Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining the initial belief that Morse
was a limited opinion, noting that [f]or instance, John W. Whitehead, president of the Rutherford Institute, told the Washington Post that the decision should have a limited effect because
it applies only to student speech that promotes illegal drug use. Similarly, Susan Goldammer,
an attorney for the Missouri School Boards Association, observed that [t]he court explains this
decision is narrowly tailored toward illegal drugs. In fact, the author of this law journal article,
along with a colleague, opined in an August 2007 commentary that the case may be considered
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opinion and especially language in a concurring opinion written by Justice Samuel
Alito paved the way for a broad interpretation of the Courts decision that lower courts
have used in instances of violent student speech.412
However, just because some courts have used Morse to decide cases of violent student expression,413 it does not necessarily mean this expansion of the decision is appropriate. As Professor Calvert argues, the harm posed by the use of illegal drugs is simply
different than the harm posed by school violence and makes for a poor analogy.414
Yet the strongest argument against using Justice Alitos concurrence in applying Morse
to violent speech is the simple observation by Professor Calvert that even if the justice
had articulated a new standard for regulating violent expression in public schools,
such a test would have constituted mere dicta because the case in Morse had nothing
to do with violent expression.415
The application of Morse has been limited in the area of violent non-sponsored
curricular speech primarily because most of the cases discussed in Part II predate the
Supreme Courts most recent student speech decision. However, two post-Morse cases
cite the decision only for general principles,416 as Cuff was analyzed under Tinker417
and the Cox court did not use student speech jurisprudence to decide its case.418
a minor victory for schoolslimited to the narrow circumstances of curtailing decidedly prodrug messages that lack a political component. In a nutshell, the Morse ruling appeared relatively inconsequential for future student expression battles, cabined by its peculiar facts.
(footnotes omitted)).
412
See, e.g., id. at 67 (explaining how Justice Alitos concurring opinion is used to broadly
interpret Morse); Negrón, supra note 402, at 122324 (pointing out how language in the majoritys opinion can be used to argue for a broader interpretation of the decision); see also supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
413
See Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 1221 (discussing courts that have used
Morse to decide cases of violent, and even merely insulting, student expression).
414
See id. at 16 (But such an extrapolation from Morse of a new censorship rule centering
on physical safety and danger is off-base and misguided. Why? Because the locus of the harm
is very different with illegal drug use than it is with violence. In a nutshell, the problem with illegal drug use by a high school student involves harm to selfharm to the student who engages
in the illegal conduct. In contrast, the problem with illegal violence committed by a high school
student involves harm to othersthe students who fall victim to the actor that engages in the
violent conduct. Put differently, the use of illegal drugs threatens the physical safety of the
individual students who engage in the dangerous conduct themselves: drugs are dangerous to
those who use them.).
415
Id. at 10.
416
See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing other lower-court decisions under Morse that have allowed wide leeway to school administrators disciplining students for writings or other conduct threatening violence); Cox v.
Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 27273 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Morse for general
student speech principles such as the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings).
417
See Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113 (establishing Tinker as controlling).
418
See Cox, 654 F.3d at 273 (concluding case should be decided based on First Amendment
retaliation claim).
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Therefore, at least in the examples of violent non-sponsored curricular speech, there
does not appear to be an embrace of an expanded interpretation of Morse.
In conclusion, Fraserand by extension Morserepresent a danger to the First
Amendment because they do not rely on the actual harms caused by speech in determining whether speech should be censored, and therefore, these decisions should be
carefully limited in their application in lower courts.419 The standard in Fraser should
be left to govern only sexual expression, an area that has been distinguished from other
types of speech by the Supreme Court. And finally, the opinion in Morse should be
read as addressing only that student speech which can reasonably be understood as
advocating the use of illegal drugs. Neither standard is controlling nor appropriate in
the area of violent non-sponsored curricular speech.
C. Why Tinker Is Not Controlling
As discussed in Part II, courts have used Tinker to decide cases of violent nonsponsored curricular speech, but the application in these cases has often left something to be desired intellectually, with some courts using the harm from a possible
incident of school violence to satisfy the rigors of the Tinker test instead of considering the actual or hypothetical harm from student speech.420 In considering whether
Tinker should apply in these cases, it is important to first note that the iconic decision
has been somewhat marginalized by the Supreme Court cases that followed it.421 With
Tinker well on its way to being confined to its facts, perhaps the best way forward
is to make another exception to the decision and find that, once again, a new standard
is needed to address a particular problem in student speech.
After the Court elected to create fact-based exceptions to Tinker in Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, it is clear the decision is waning in importance.422 What is not so
clear, however, is exactly how Tinker should be applied in the post-Morse student
speech landscape. As Christopher Cavaliere notes, courts generally take one of three
views of Tinker: looking at the decision as just another category of unprotected
speech, a general rule that protects student speech unless one of the other three
419
See Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 172 (Viewed at a macro-level, Frasers
embrace of the principle that the meaning of a message, standing alone and without proof of
any harm caused by it, can lead to its censorship directly conflicts with the heart of modern First
Amendment theory, which holds that society must tolerate some level of demonstrable harm.).
420
See supra Part II.B.
421
See, e.g., Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1169 (arguing that Tinker
is overshadowed by Morse and currently being relegated for use only in those cases that
mirror or closely parallel its facts); Perry A. Zirkel, The Rockets Red Glare: The Largely
Errant and Deflected Flight of Tinker, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 597 (2009) (calling Tinker
practically revers[ed] or, at least, effectively compartmentaliz[ed]).
422
See Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1173 (The most obvious indicator
of Tinkers decline is that, in each of the three subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving
student expression rights, the Court chose: (1) not to apply Tinker; (2) to carve out fact-specific
exceptions to Tinker; and (3) to rule in favor of school officials and against students.).
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categories apply, or a view that Tinker may specifically protect political speech.423
Thus the first two categories operate by positioning Tinker as either one of four possible
options in a courts arsenal or the default rule if Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse do not
apply due to the factual circumstances of the case.424 Leaving Tinker as a default rule
seems unsatisfactory in a world where the Supreme Court has so thoroughly chipped
away at the decision. In other words, Tinker would be a fine default rule where it was
the only rule. Framing Tinker as a rule protecting only political speech seems needlessly
narrow and fraught with the additional problem of deciding what is and what is not
political speech. The best answer for Tinker is Cavalieres first category.425 Tinker,
therefore, should have situations where it does apply and situations where it distinctly
does not apply.
In answering the question of when Tinker should apply, it is important to consider
the facts of the case. Tinker, fundamentally, was about taking an external issuea protest over the Vietnam Warand bringing it into the school environment by having students wear the now famous black armbands.426 The protest at issue in Tinker did not
have its genesis on campus; rather, it was first imagined by a group of parents and
students in an off-campus meeting.427 Therefore presumably, the Vietnam War had
nothing to do with any of the ongoing studies at the Des Moines high school, making
the armbands noncurricular speech. The Court, however, did not make this distinction,
choosing instead to broadly affirm the First Amendment right of students after discussing the foundational cases that made such a right possible:
The principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised
and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types
of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do not embrace
merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
423

Cavaliere, supra note 398, at 886; see also Matthew Sheffield, Note, Stop with the Exceptions: A Narrow Interpretation of Tinker for All Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POLY & ETHICS J. 175, 177 (2011) (arguing that Tinker was meant to apply only where a student was expressing an opinion on an issue of political significance or when the school was
discriminating against the student solely based upon disagreement with the students viewpoint).
424
See Cavaliere, supra note 398, at 88791.
425
See id. at 88788 (Tinkers disruptive speech is merely one among the four different
types of speech that a school may permissibly regulate.). Deciding that this is the proper interpretation of Tinker, however, requires more subtlety than leaving the decision to govern only
disruptive speech.
426
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
427
Id.
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playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he
may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights
of others.428
So with the Court not making a distinction in the origin of the message or its connection to the schools curriculum, a distinction made today is therefore somewhat artificial. Yet this distinction is critical in determining Tinkers true place after the trifecta
of cases that followed in its wake. Tinker, at its core, permits a student to express
noncurricular speech so long as that speech does not interfere with the workings of
the school. It thus allows for the black armband on the playground, the lunchroom, and
even the classroom. What Tinker does not specifically consider, however, is what happens when the black armband is worn or discussed in the context of a history or current
events course.
In his Hazelwood dissent, Justice William Brennan attempted to reconcile the
Tinker standard with allowing schools to control student speech in the course of a
schools curriculum. Arguing that the decision in Hazelwood was unnecessary and
that Tinker could have easily resolved the problem at issue, Justice Brennan wrote:
Under Tinker, school officials may censor only such student speech
as would materially disrup[t] a legitimate curricular function.
Manifestly, student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular
function when it arises in the context of a curricular activityone
that is designed to teach somethingthan when it arises in the
context of a noncurricular activity. Thus, under Tinker, the school
may constitutionally punish the budding political orator if he disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria. That is not because some more stringent standard applies in
the curricular context. . . . It is because student speech in the noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate pedagogical purpose.429
When Justice Brennan noted that student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the context of a curricular activity,430 he was undoubtedly correct, but his reasoning fails to account for student speech related to the
428

Id. at 51213 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
429
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 283 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
430
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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curricular activity. Indeed, as Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority in Tinker, Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. . . . Any word spoken, in
class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.431 But, to borrow Justice
Brennans calculus example, how do we account for the disturbance that comes when
a student accurately notes that his teacher made an error when finding a derivative?
Or, to return to Tinker, how do we analyze the disturbance that arises when a student
voices opposition to the Vietnam War during a 1965 lesson on current events? Furthermore, what happens when a students violent short story, poem, or other creation that
follows all prescribed elements of an assignment emotionally disturbs an English class
or its teacher? Tinker views the presence of a disruption in the school setting as a
binary questioneither there is a disruption (meaning the students speech can be
censored) or there is not a disruption (meaning the student is allowed to speak). Yet
the standard does not consider that in some instances, a disturbance is simply the
natural result of the educational process.
Ultimately, the applicability of Tinker to non-sponsored curricular speech should
be decided by two important points: that (1) Tinker is fundamentally a question of
noncurricular speech and (2) the standards failure to adequately account for what
amounts to a positive disturbance in the learning process. Again, Tinker would be
a wonderful standard in a world where it could be interpreted fairly and consistently,432 and where it existed as the only word from the Supreme Court on the matter
of student speech. But since it has been so eroded by Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse,
it must now be limited in its application to instances where it is fundamentally
appropriatenamely situations of noncurricular speech. Therefore, Tinker should
not be the standard by which cases of violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases
are decided.
431

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
See, e.g., Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1188 (The Tinker test itself
has multiple flaws that harm its effectiveness and, concomitantly, has led to its misuse and abuse.
As aptly recognized by Professor Mark Yudof, current president of the University of California:
When I was a law professor, I used to ask my students the following questions: What counts
as a disruption? How much disruption will outweigh the assertion of the right? How are these
interests balanced? Is this rule, with its emphasis on identifying disruption in schools, a rule
at all, or is it just an invitation to judges to assert their personal ideologies and persuasions?
(footnote omitted)); R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 12 (2014)
(A final, largely recently developed limitation on Tinker is the sensible desire to broadly interpret, if not expand, the Tinker disruption prong. While the Tinker standard in general has
been and remains somewhat unclear, the disruption prong does tend to conjure up mental
images of something like an angry hallway confrontation, if not a physical altercation, or threat
thereof. (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 25 (suggesting that at this point in our history,
it is implausible that Tinker, along with its refinements, qualifications, and limitations, amounts
to the only constitutionally permissible approach to student speech, as the public schools
seek to better and more cost-effectively discharge their vital and multi-faceted basic mission).
432
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D. Why Hazelwood Is Not Controlling
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, Hazelwood would be a logical
fit for these cases aside from its requirement that speech falling under the scope of
the decision be both curricular in nature and sponsored by a school.433 For the cases
discussed in Part II, the ties to curriculum and education are fairly evident in stories
written for class,434 artwork either created for class or commissioned by a teacher,435
a poem submitted to a teacher for critique,436 and a website that had its start with an
in-class writing assignment.437 All of these examples are deeply integrated in the
instructional duty of the school and are therefore types of speech schools should nurture
and guide as part of their educational missionthus making this speech inherently
curricular. The question of sponsorship, however, is more difficult to answer, but the
most logical solution, after examining Hazelwood, is that sponsorship requires more
than a mere connection to the school. This conclusion, when combined with the observation that Hazelwood fails to make an adequate distinction between educational and
punitive measures, suggests that Hazelwood cannot properly address the issues surrounding violent non-sponsored student speech.
In Hazelwood, the Court distinguished student speech that a school must tolerate
from student speech that a school must affirmatively . . . promote, with the former
category of speech being governed by Tinker and the latter falling under Hazelwood.438
Speech falling under Hazelwood was further defined as school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents,
433
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 27071 (The question whether the First Amendment
requires a school to tolerate particular student speechthe question that we addressed in
Tinkeris different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators ability
to silence a students personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
latter question concerns educators authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly
be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.); see also id. at 273
([W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.).
434
E.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2011); D.F. v. Bd.
of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001).
435
E.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012); Demers
v. Leominster Sch. Dept., 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003); Boman v. Bluestem Unified
Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000); In re
Ryan D., 100 Cal. App. 4th 854 (2002).
436
E.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
437
E.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
438
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 27071.
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and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.439 As the Court argued, teachers and administrators had greater authority to
exercise control over this Hazelwood category of curricular speech to assure that
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school.440 But a mere connection to education and learning was not enough to
trigger Hazelwood for the Court, which held that the speech in question must also
be reasonably perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school.441
Imprimatur, from the Latin for let it be printed, was originally a license required for publication, and today, it is also defined as [a] general grant of approval.442
Thus the inquiry into whether speech bears the imprimatur of the school seeks to
answer, in essence, whether the student speech at issue might reasonably be perceived
as carrying the official banner of the school.443 With the examples given by the Court
in Hazelwood, the issue of imprimatur seems intuitive, as the Court cites school publications and theatrical productions as two expressive activities that would naturally
bear the seal of the school.444 Lower courts have also found art installations445 and
commencement speeches446 to be types of student expression that generally bear the
schools imprimaturinstallations because of their fixation to school walls and
speeches because of the vetting and approval process of most commencement speakers.
As the Tenth Circuit concluded in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District, [e]xpressive activities that do not bear the imprimatur of the school could include a variety
of activities conducted by outside groups that take place on school facilities afterschool, such as club meetings where expressive activities that the school allows to be
integrated permanentlyinto the school environment and that students pass byduring the
school day come much closer to reasonably bearing the imprimatur of the school.447
439

Id. at 271.
Id.
441
Id.
442
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014).
443
See Jordan, supra note 110, at 156061 (2003) ([A] schools promotion of speech introduces the possibility that the expression will be attributed to the school itself. Speech that bears
the imprimatur of the school resembles official speech, leaving the school free to employ reasonable measures to guard against misattribution. (footnote omitted)).
444
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
445
See, e.g., Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004); Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
446
See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McKay v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 510 F. Appx 3 (2d Cir.
2013); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009).
447
Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925. Fleming is somewhat notable in the context of a discussion
of student speech and the surrounding anxiety regarding school violence as the case stems
froman art project at Columbine High School after the 1999 shooting. Id. at 92021. The project
allowed students and community members to paint tiles that would then be installed as part of
the reconstruction process. Id. at 921.
440
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But where does this leave in-class assignments as far as bearing the imprimatur
of the school? In Settle v. Dickson County School Board,448 the Sixth Circuit upheld
a summary judgment decision in favor of a school district where a student complained that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was not allowed to
write a research paper on The Life of Jesus Christ.449 The majority easily brushed
aside the students claim in favor of broadly affirming a teachers right to assign
grades,450 but in her concurring opinion, Judge Alice M. Batchelder took a more nuanced view of the students First Amendment claim.451 As the judge argued, the facts
in Settle could not be made to fit within the framework of cases such as Hazelwood
and Tinker, suggesting that the question of a students speech rights in a curricular
assignment without school sponsorship were a distinctly different issue not answered
by Supreme Court jurisprudence.452 Tinker did not apply, the judge reasoned, because [a] research paper is not an expression of opinion, and the restriction of choice
of topic is not readily analogous to the kind of pure expression of student opinion, that
happened to take place in the classroom, that the Supreme Court addressed there.453
Similarly, the facts in Settle were different from Hazelwood because there was no
way to make a colorable claim that this paper is speech which might be viewed by the
community as bearing the imprimatur of the school, a determination that Judge
Batchelder argued was central to the Supreme Courts holding in Hazelwood.454
As she further concluded: Certainly not all student speech in the classroom bears
the imprimatur of the school.455
Aside from the questionable proposition that student assignments can even carry
the implicit sign of approval from a school, student speech in such cases is much easier
for a school to disassociate itself from, a point that then-Judge Samuel Alito made in
448

53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 153. The case was framed as a matter of student speech instead of a religious claim,
as the court explained: Although this paper topic concerns religious subject matter, the plaintiff
does not bring her case under the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Instead, she has chosen to challenge [the teachers] rejection of her topic as restricting her rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Id.
450
See id. at 15556 (Teachers may frequently make mistakes in grading and otherwise, just
as we do sometimes in deciding cases, but it is the essence of the teachers responsibility in the
classroom to draw lines and make distinctionsin a word to encourage speech germane to the
topic at hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on the subject. Teachers therefore
must be given broad discretion to give grades and conduct class discussion based on the content
of speech. Learning is more vital in the classroom than free speech.); see also id. at 155
(Grades are given as incentives for study, and they are the currency by which school work
is measured.).
451
See id. at 15659 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
452
Id. at 158.
453
Id.
454
Id.
455
Id.
449
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his dissent in C.H. v. Oliva.456 In Oliva, an en banc Third Circuit split and thereby
affirmed a district court decision dismissing a students First Amendment claim after
his Thanksgiving poster was removed from a hall display due to a religious theme. 457
In his dissent, Judge Alito argued that nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its standard applies when a student is called upon to express his or her personal views in class
or in an assignment,458 an observation that again emphasizes the importance of the
imprimatur requirement. Additionally in the case of a student assignment, the danger
to the school of having a students speech misattributed to the administration is much
less because if anyone might have reasonably interpreted the display of [the students]
poster in the hall as an effort by the school to endorse Christianity or religion, the
school could have posted a sign explaining that the children themselves had decided
what to draw.459
Thus, using Alitos logic and the examples cited in Hazelwood, a students assignment is different from a school newspaper or a school play because (1) the assignment does not carry the imprimatur of the school and (2) even if the assignment was
attributable to the school, the administration could easily distance itself from a students
speech. Hazelwood, therefore, would be inapplicable where a student was expressing
a personal opinion during the course of an assignment.460
Still, however, some courts broadly interpret or ignore the imprimatur requirement
or otherwise fail to apply Hazelwood correctly, resulting in a departure from the text
of the decision and an expansion in its application.461 As just one example of this misapplication, the Sixth Circuit stated in Curry v. Hensiner462 that Hazelwood grants schools
greater latitude to restrict . . . speech where student expression is school-sponsored speech, such as a newspaper, or speech made as part of a schools curriculum.463
That either-or proposition is clearly incorrect where the Supreme Court specified that
for Hazelwood to apply, student speech must be both sponsoredin terms of bearing
the schools imprimaturand connected to the schools curriculum.464
If more courts followed a similar interpretation to Hazelwood, then the question of
violent non-sponsored curricular speech would at least have a clear (albeit incorrect)
answer as the curricular nature of the cases discussed in Part I would automatically
bring them under Hazelwood even though the speech in question lacked the imprimatur of the school. However, as Judge Batchelder astutely noted in Settle, student
456

226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 20001. The poster indicated the student was thankful for Jesus. Id. at 201.
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Id. at 213 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 21213.
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See id. at 213.
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See Jordan, supra note 110, at 1569 (arguing that faulty analysis leads to an increase in the
application of Hazelwood to the detriment of student speech rights).
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513 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
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See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 27071 (1988) (explaining the elements of school-promoted student speech).
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speech as communicated in assignments fall(s) somewhere in between Hazelwood
and Tinker as a form of student expression allowed under the school curriculum but not
sponsored or endorsed by the school.465 But this positioning of non-sponsored curricular expression as somewhere between Hazelwood and Tinker presupposes a neat and
orderly spectrum of protection for student rights where that is not entirely accurate.
At its inception, the Tinker standard was deployed to address the intersection of
noncurricular speech and noncurricular punishments, meaning responses by school
administrators to student speech that are generally punitive and unrelated to curriculum or education.466 Hazelwood, conversely, examines curricular speech and the curricular response from a school.467 However, most of the violent non-sponsored
student speech cases examined in this Article represent curricular speech that was
met with a noncurricular response in the form of a punitive suspension or even criminal
charges against a student. Specifically examining the typical response levied against
a student in cases of violent non-sponsored curricular speech, it is therefore difficult
to say that Tinker offers more protection than Hazelwood, especially where the general
application of Tinker results in perfunctory analysis cloaked in the worries of school
violence and deference to school administrators. But that is not to say that an expansion
of Hazelwood would cure all ills in this area. Where courts have found a legitimate
pedagogical concern in avoiding the disruption to the schools learning environment to justify Hazelwood censorship,468 it is not hard to envision a student suspension upheld under an expanded Hazelwood as a writer of violent fiction or an artist
creating violent compositions would simply be a distraction and subsequent disruption in the learning environment. An expansion of Hazelwood, therefore, is unsuitable
for the purposes of addressing the problem of violent non-sponsored student expression
because it does not expressly protect students against punitive disciplinary measures.
Thus Hazelwood joins the true threat doctrine, Fraser, Morse, and, finally, Tinker
as doctrinal approaches to violent non-sponsored curricular speech as possible solutions
that fail to adequately address the First Amendment issues that arise when a student
is disciplined for violent speech that is associated with a schools curriculum but not
reasonably interpreted as coming from the school itself. A new standard, therefore,
465

Settle v. Dickinson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1995) (Batchelder, J.,
concurring).
466
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). The students
were not allowed to attend school so long as they were wearing the protest armbands. Id. It
is doubtful this response was designed to teach anything to the students.
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See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 26364. The First Amendment rights of the students in
Hazelwood may have been violated, but their punishment (in that two pages were removed
from the school newspaper) was designed in some way, perhaps, to teach. See id. at 271
(explaining that a school may censor sponsored, curricular speech where it is ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences).
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Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2004) (citing Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 934 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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is needed to govern this particular subset of student speecha standard that will be
explained in Part IV.
IV. A STANDARD FOR NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR SPEECH
This Article proposes the following standard for violent non-sponsored curricular speech: In instances where non-true threat violent student speech is curricular in
nature and not sponsored by the school, the First Amendment forbids punitive discipline by school administrators. Rather, the only remedies for teachers and administrators in these cases should be pedagogical and therapeutic counter speech from school
officials designed to teach and counselrather than punishstudents. This Part will
explain the operation of this new standard and examine the many options left to school
administrators when their ability to punitively suspend or even expel students is no
longer constitutional.
As Judge Batchelder speculated in her concurrence in Settle, the First Amendment
protection for a students assignment would necessarily fall between Tinker and
Hazelwood.469 Following this line of analysis, Adam Hoesing argued that such a
standard must fall somewhere between Tinkers full protection and Hazelwoods
rational-basis protection. Thus, some form of intermediate protection, perhaps?470
Again, however, the best possible solution does not necessarily have to fall between
those two decisions in a straight line. Therefore, the proposed standard for violent
non-sponsored curricular speech borrows elements from both decisions. From Tinker,
the standard takes a relatively pro-student approach to school speech as it is built on
the assumption that student First Amendment rights are critical to education471 and the
fostering of a new generation of citizens. Conversely, the standard takes from Hazelwood the implicit understanding that schools are a place for education and that administrators must be in charge of the curriculum and learning.
The operation of the standard is designed to be straightforward. If a school administrator is presented with a piece of violent non-sponsored curricular student speechas
discussed, this will generally be an assignment in the form of a story, poem, or other
creative workthe administrator may first ascertain whether the work, and by extension the student, represents a threat. This investigation should be guided by common
sense principles regarding threats: Was the speech communicated directly to the target
of the perceived threat? Was it a conditional threat designed to motivate the recipient?
How specific was the threat? Were there any mitigating elements (such as parody,
hyperbole or sarcasm) to suggest there was no intent to threaten? In short, this is a
highly factual examination designed only as a preliminary step; if it appears to truly
represent a threat, it may be examined using the true threat analysis and then subsequently the Tinker doctrine if the speech is constitutionally protected. Either the
469
470
471

Settle, 53 F.3d at 158 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
Hoesing, supra note 110, at Part IV.
But cf. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156 (Learning is more vital in the classroom than free speech.).
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substantive appearance of a true threat472 or the lack of a connection to education
removes the speech in question from this admittedly permissive standard and again
places it in the realm of true threat analysis and Tinker.
If the violent non-sponsored curricular student speech at issue is not a threat, then
the school may deal with it as it sees fit, consistent with the educational principles
contained in Hazelwood. The only limitation on this authority is that the school must
confront curricular speech with a curricular responsei.e., some type of pedagogical
counter speech rather than a strictly disciplinary measure.
This proscription on a disciplinary response is premised on two points. First, the
state should be unable to punish speech that it, in effect, commissioned, as a matter of
fundamental fairness. Second, granting schools Hazelwood authority over speech
not covered by the decision should come with the implied (but not expressed) restriction
to a curricular response contained in the decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
illustrated the natural tension in using Hazelwood to discipline students:
[S]chools may discipline student speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, or inadequately researched. While
few people likely question this authority, it is important to note
that even this type of disciplinebe it correcting a typographical
error, having a student rewrite a particular assignment, or the
likeinfringes to some extent upon otherwise protected speech.
Nevertheless, when examined in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, this speech, like speech that more
dramatically interferes with a schools educational mission, may
be disciplined without contravening the First Amendment.473
Correcting student speech that is ungrammatical, poorly written, or inadequately
researched is simply a function of teaching; it is not discipline as the court framed
it. Discipline is punitive, and there is little punitive intent behind a teachers red ink.
As Jonathan Pyle noted: Detention and suspension are unusual repercussions for
failure to recite the Gettysburg Address correctly. The educational process would
not seriously be harmed if teachers were constrained to teach subject matter with grades
and maintain order with the discipline code.474 Hazelwood is premised on the notion
of education rather than punitive discipline, and therefore, any similar curricular speech
standard must reflect this fundamental reality.
472

The natural inclination of many in the school setting will be to read true threats into expression where they may not be present. However, a students intent should be at the forefront
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assignment may be a true threat).
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In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 743 n.17 (Wis. 2001) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
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Pyle, supra note 156, at 610.

2015]

NEITHER TINKER, HAZELWOOD, FRASER, NOR MORSE

853

So if a school cannot suspend, expel, or otherwise punitively react to violent nonsponsored curricular speech, what can it do? In short, a school can engage in any pedagogical or therapeutic counter speech that it finds necessary to address the situation.
Generally, counter speech is the idea that whenever speech is feared for its potential
negative effects, the proper solution is not to silence the speech but to respond to it
with more speech.475 In the school setting, if violent student speech is feared, then
the proper constitutional response is to reply to that speech with the best pedagogical
counter speech tool available: a grade. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Settle, [g]rades
are given as incentives for study, and they are the currency by which school work
is measured.476 Therefore, if teachers and administrators find a students assignment
to be impermissibly violent, then the school should simply assign a grade that
reflects that displeasure. Under such an outcome, the school is allowed to voice its
opinion of the impropriety of violent expression in the school setting, and the student
is given an opportunity to learn that expression often has consequences.
However, in some instances a school may not wish to reflect its displeasure with
a grade or it may be unable to do so in those situations where the student expression
at issue is not a formalized assignment.477 In those cases, a school can still counsel a
student without the formal structure of the grading process. In LaVine, for example,
a students violent poem was given to his teacher for evaluation outside of the formal
curriculum of the school.478 Instead of punishing the student with an emergency
expulsion,479 the teacher and other school officials could have told the student that,
while violence is often commonplace in poetry and art, the inclusion of a school
shooting fantasy into a poem is inappropriate where students, teachers, and other
members of the school community are generally afraid of school violence. Furthermore, the school administrators could have prompted the student to seek counseling
or other help for his emotional state. In essence, they could have acted as educators
and leaders and taught the students they sought to punish.
475

See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 28586 (2001) (discussing
the doctrine of counter speech).
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Settle, 53 F.3d at 155.
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See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (where the
student speech was a website inspired by course assignments); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
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LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984.
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See id. at 983 (Although this is a close case in retrospect, we conclude that when the
school officials expelled [the student] they acted with sufficient justification and within constitutional limits, not to punish [the student] for the content of his poem, but to avert perceived potential harm.). As per this exigency, the student missed a total of seventeen days of class. Id. at 986.
It is difficult to say for certain how long it takes to determine whether a student is a threat, but
a seventeen-day suspension is presumptively punitive rather than precautionary. Cf. Cox v.
Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2011) (where a student was
determined to not be a threat in a single day).
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Violent student speech may indeed be inherently unsettling in the school environment, but the answer to this dilemma should never be a punitive response. Where violent student speech is curricular in nature, both its ties to education and the First
Amendment should insulate that speech from a purely disciplinary response. There
is no constitutional right implicated, however, where a school responds to violent curricular student speech with a failing grade. Indeed, if schools are to teach by example
the shared values of a civilized social order480 by instructing students that violent
imagery has no place in the post-Columbine American school, then grades are the most
effective and appropriate tool with which to truly teach such a lesson.
CONCLUSION
If Part IVs standard for violent non-sponsored curricular speech was applied to the
previously discussed cases, many of the decisions would see a reversal in favor of
student plaintiffs. LaVine would certainly be such a reversal as it is difficult to argue
how a seventeen-day emergency expulsion is anything but a punitive response to
student curricular speech.481 Similarly in Cuff, a five-day suspension was certainly
punitive where the school did not attempt to ascertain whether the students astronaut drawing represented a threat, as such a failure to investigate represents a tacit
acknowledgement that the students speech was mere creative expression in the
course of a school assignment.482
Cox, however, represents a course of action taken by school administrators that
would be fully upheld under the new standard. When a teacher was concerned about a
students casual description of illegal activity, violence, and suicide in an assignment for class, the teacher passed her concerns along to the principal, who then took the
student into an in-school suspension room while the principal considered whether
[the student] posed an imminent threat to himself or others, and whether he should
be disciplined for his essay.483 After the principal decided the student was not a threat,
he was returned to class, and the matter was over.484
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment includes both protections for speech and the right to refrain from speaking at all.485 But that insulation from the dangers of compelled speech does not translate well to a classroom setting
where students are required to complete assignments, resulting in a fundamental unfairness when students are disciplined as a result of their coursework. Using disciplinary
480
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measures to punish violent student speech is not only inconsistent with some of the
fundamental principles of education, but it is also incompatible with the logical reality
of the school setting. If the student suspensions discussed in this Article were premised
on protecting members of the school community, there are two important faults with
that reasoning. The first is that discipline applied in this setting could have a chilling
effect on other students who might seek to express themselves using violent imagery. If the concept of leakagemeaning that students who seek to harm others often
detail their plans before an episode of violenceis to be believed, then chilling violent
student speech would only suppress potential warnings of an attack. The second
logical problem with this application of discipline is that, as Richard Salgado wrote,
[e]xpelling or suspending a student does not preclude the student from returning
to campus with a loaded gun.486 School discipline in these cases is simply not making
any school any safer.
The cases discussed in this Article mayrepresent examples of speech with marginal
independent value, but that value becomes magnified when violent speech is used by
a student in the process of education. These cases, in essence, matter, and they matter
despite our squeamishness with the idea of school violence; they matter because
education and the First Amendment matter. As a dissenting Circuit Court judge in
Cuff argued,
While the concept of irony may seem well beyond the ken of
an average ten-year-old, young children routinely experiment with
the seeds of satire. They learn by fumbling their way to finding
the boundaries between socially permissible, and even encouraged, forms of expression that employ exaggeration for rhetorical effect, and impermissible and offensive remarks that merely
threaten and alienate those around them.
This young boys drawing was clearly not some subtle, ironic
jab at his school or broader commentary about education. It was
a crude joke. But the First Amendment should make us hesitate
before silencing students who experiment with hyperbole for comic
effect, however unknowing and unskillful that experimentation
may be.487
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